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Abstract/Resumé
This  project  seeks  to  discuss  the  possibility  of  thinking  machines.  First  the  technical  side  of
Artificial Intelligence (A.I.) is discussed with reference to Alan Turing’s Turing machines and John
Haugeland’s automated formal systems. This is followed by a definition of A.I.  as put forth in
Turing’s famous description of the Turing Test. John Searle’s Chinese Room argument is presented
as  an  objection  to  the  notion  of  Strong  A.I..  Bram van  Heuveln  proves  through  an  advanced
Systems Reply that Searle’s Chinese Room argument is inconsistent because it commits the fallacy
of composition. Heuveln argues instead for the weak computationalist claim that cognition reduces
to  computations.  Hubert  Dreyfus  critiques  Heuveln’s  assumption  and  Maurice  Merleau-Ponty
argues that embodiment is essential in explaining human consciousness. The project discusses these
different  viewpoints  and  concludes  the  following:  There  is  a  correspondence  between  Searle’s
concept  of  intentionality  and  Merleau-Ponty’s  notion  of  embodiment.  Van  Heuveln’s
computationalist claim is plausible in a weak sense, but ultimately unprovable in a strong sense,
meaning that while cognition can be described in computational terms, it cannot currently be proven
whether  cognition  actually  reduces  to  computations.  The  notion  of  disembodied  artificial
intelligence  appears  incoherent  due  to  the  lack  of  certain  attributes  important  to  human
consciousness,  namely  intentionality  and  embodiment.  Computationalism  in  a  weak  sense  is
compatible  with  the  embodiment  argument  in  a  weak sense.  It  remains  unanswered,  however,
whether thinking machines are possible or not.
Dette projekt diskuterer muligheden for tænkende maskiner. Først diskuteres den tekniske side af
kunstig  intelligens  med  reference  til  Alan  Turings  Turing  maskiner  og  John  Haugelands
automatiserede formelle systemer. Efterfølgende defineres en forståelse af kunstig intelligens, som
den fremføres af Alan Turing beskrivelse af   Turing-testen. John Searles Chinese Room argument
præsenteres  som  et  modsvar  til  idéen  om  stærk  kunstig  intelligens.  Bram  van  Heuveln  viser
igennem et avanceret Systems Reply at Searles Chinese Room argument er inkonsistent fordi den
laver en kompositionsfejlslutning. I stedet argumenterer van Heuveln for den komputationaliske
påstand at kognition kan reduceres til udregninger. Hubert Dreyfus kritisere van Heuvelns antagelse
og  Maurice  Merleau-Ponty  argumenterer  at  kropsliggørelse  (“embodiment”)  er  essentiel  for  at
kunne  forklare  menneskelig  bevidsthed.  Projektet  diskuterer  disse  forskellige  synspunkter  og
konkluderer følgende: Der er overensstemmelse mellem Searles intentionalitetsbegreb og Merleau-
Ponty’s embodiment-begreb. Van Heuvelns komputationalistiske påstand er sandsynlig i en svag
forstand, men kan ikke bevises i en stærk forstand. Dette betyder at mens kognition kan beskrives
med  henvisning  til  udregninger,  er  det  ikke  klart,  hvorvidt  kognition  faktisk  kan  reduceres  til
udregninger. Ideen om en ikke-kropslig kunstig intelligens virker usammenhængende på grund af
dens mangel på visse egenskaber, som er vigtige for menneskelig bevidsthed, nemlig intentionalitet
og embodiment. Komputationalisme i en svag forstand er kompatibel med embodiment-argumentet
i en svag forstand. Det forbliver uvist hvorvidt tænkende maskiner er mulige eller ej.
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Dieses Projekt diskutiert, ob denkende Maschinen möglich sind. Zunächst wird die technische Seite
der künstlichen Intelligenz mit Referenz zu Alan Turings Turing-Maschinen und John Haugelands
automatisierten  formellen  Systemen  diskutiert.  Danach  wird  eine  Definition  von  künstlicher
Intelligenz  präsentiert,  die  in  der  Beschreibung  des  sogenannten  Turing-testes  erschien.  John
Searles „Chinese Room“-Argument wird als  einer Entgegnung der Idee der starken künstlichen
Intelligenz  präsentiert.  Bram  van  Heuveln  zeigt  durch  eine  forschrittende  Systemantwort  dass
Searles „Chinese Room“-Argument widersprüchlich ist, weil das Argument einen Fehlschluss der
Komposition  macht.  Stattdessen  argumentiert  van  Heuveln  für  die  komputationalistische
Behauptung, dass Kognition zu Ausrechnungen reduziert werden kann. Hubert Dreyfus kritisiert
diese Behauptung von van Heuveln, und Maurice Merleau-Ponty argumentiert dass  Embodiment
(„„Körperlichmachen“) essenziell für eine Erklärung der menschlichen Bewusstheit ist. Das Projekt
diskutiert  diese  unterschiedlichen  Blickwinkeln  und  konkludiert  folgend:  Es  gibt  eine
Übereinstimmung  zwischen  den  Intentionalitätsbegriff  von  Searle  und  Merleau-Pontys
Embodiment-Begriff.  Die  komputationalistische  Behauptung  von  van  Heuveln  ist  in  einem
schwachen Sinn wahrscheinlich, aber unbeweisbar in einem starken Sinn. Das heißt, obwohl die
Kognition  durch  Berechnungen  beschreiben  werden  kann,  ist  es  nicht  klar,  ob  Kognition  sich
tatsächlich  zu  Berechnungen  reduzieren  lässt.  Die  Idee  der  nicht-körperlichen,  künstlichen
Intelligenz scheint unzusammenhängend wegen ihres Mangels gewisser Eigenschaften, die wichtig
für menschliche Bewusstheit sind, nämlich Intentionalität und Embodiment. Komputationalismus
ist in einem schwachen Sinn mit dem Embodiment-Argument in einem schwachen Sinn vereinbar.
Es bleibt die Frage, ob denkende Maschinen möglich sind oder nicht.
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Introduction
Can machines think?
Alan Mathison Turing, a British pioneer in varied fields such as mathematics, code-breaking,
cryptology,  logic  and Artificial  Intelligence  (A.I.)1,  stated  this  very question  in  his  1950 paper
“Computing machinery and intelligence” four years before his untimely death in 1954. Granted, in
the  paper  he  condemns  the  question  for  vagueness  and  proposes  that  this  question  instead  be
replaced with a different question, namely whether computers can pass the so-called  Turing Test.
We shall return to Turing's famous test shortly, but first we will further explore the intuitive notion
of thinking machines.
If machines can think, that is,  if  machines are able to think in the human sense (or perhaps
human senses) of the word, the creation of such a machine, in the words of Professor of Philosophy
at the University of California,  Hubert  Dreyfus, might bring about an “even greater conceptual
revolution” than that of the Computer revolution or the Industrial  revolution before it  (Dreyfus
1972:xxvi)2. His reasoning deserves to be quoted verbatim:
Aristotle defined man as a rational animal, and since then reason has been held to be the
essence of man. If we are on the threshold of creating artificial intelligence we are about to
see the triumph of a very special conception of reason. […] The incarnation of this intuition
will drastically change our understanding of ourselves (Dreyfus 1972:xxvi).
The creation of A.I. allows for a deeper understanding of what it means to be human. If we can
program a computer to reason, this must roughly mean that we've mastered the mysteries of human
reason. If we can build it, we can understand it. We could imagine that psychology and cognitive
science  might  be  integrated  even  further  with  computer  science,  whose  models  of  artificial
intelligence would form the basis of a new approach to the human mind. If A.I. were to turn out to
be an impossibility,  however, this too would “radically change our view of ourselves” (Dreyfus
1972:xxvii): Not only would A.I. prove to be a dead end in the study of the inner workings of the
human  mind,  but  we  would  then  “have  to  distinguish  human  from artificial  reason”  (Dreyfus
1972:xxvii), leading us back to a perhaps even more frightening truth: that human reason is unique,
singular and impossible to imitate.
Can machines  think? This  is  the main question raised and discussed in  this  project.  Closely
related  is  the  question  whether  Computationalism,  which  states  that  cognition  reduces  to
computation (van Heuveln 2000:iv)3,  is a philosophically viable approach to the mind/theory of
mind.  Is  human  cognition  but  computations  and,  in  continuation  hereof,  can  a  machine  be
programmed to act in some interesting sense as a conscious, cognitive system?
The possibility or impossibility of artificial intelligence wasn't an issue during the first forays
into the field. Perhaps this was due in part to the particular Zeitgeist of the postwar period: with the
1 "Alan  Turing."  Encyclopaedia  Britannica.  Encyclopaedia  Britannica  Online  Academic  Edition.  Encyclopædia
Britannica Inc., 2015. Web. 20 Apr. 2015. <http://academic.eb.com/EBchecked/topic/609739/Alan-Turing>. 
2 Dreyfus, Hubert ”What Computers can't do – A Critique of Artificial Reason” (1972) Harper & Row, New York,
Evanston, San Francisco, London.
3 Heuveln, Bram v. ”Emergence and Consciousness – Explorations into the Philosophy of Mind via the Philosophy of
Computation” (2000) Binghamton University, State University of New York.
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advent of a new computerised age there was widespread enthusiasm for A.I. (Dreyfus 1972:xx-
xxxv). Turing's famous test, which would decide whether a given machine was intelligent or not,
provided a seemingly precise guideline for budding computer scientists to test the mettle of their
respective creations (Dreyfus 1972:xxi)4. A machine being humanly intelligent was thought to be an
inevitability, as the first personal computers hit the market and sophisticated computer programs
began playing chess.  As time has  passed,  however,  the notion that  A.I.  be inevitable  has  been
tempered drastically. The early enthusiasm of the 1950-1970s has since the start of the 1980s been
replaced with rigorous discussions about whether A.I. really is possible to create. Turing himself,
while  optimistically  anticipating  in  1950  that  intelligent  machines  would  be  able  to  exhibit
intelligent behaviour within half a century (Cole 2015)5, concedes that he has “no very convincing
arguments of a positive nature to support my views” (Turing 1950:454).
Whether A.I. is feasible depends on what one means by A.I. Generally there are two opposite
types of artificial intelligence; “Strong A.I.” and “Weak A.I.”. According to John Searle, Professor
of Philosophy at  Berkeley University of California,  the distinction of the two classifications of
artificial intelligence can be put like this: Strong A.I. is the position that a given computer, given the
right  programming,  “really is  a  mind” and can be “literally said to  understand and have  other
cognitive states.” The Weak A.I. position, on the other hand, is more cautious, claiming only that
intelligent computers can be used as a very powerful tool “in the study of the mind” (Searle 1980)6.
The possibility or impossibility of strong A.I.,  then,  has been the subject of debate amongst
philosophers, computer programmers and scientists alike for the past four decades. According to the
Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy Searle's infamous “Chinese Room” argument from 1980 has
“spawned a small cottage industry of philosophical articles” alone and remains “one of the more
troubling and thought-provoking contributions to this literature” (Horst 2011)7. While J. Searle's
argument against the notion of Strong A.I. remains as persuasive as ever, as we shall see below,
there also exist persuasive arguments arguing for Strong A.I. Whether Strong A.I. is possible or not
remains to be determined.
Mission statement
This project outlines and follows a historical progression from Alan Turing's first thesis on artificial
intelligence to Searle's Chinese Room argument and this argument's contemporary critics.
First we explore Alan Turing's intuitive notion of computability, which he captured in the so-
called  Turing  Machines.  We  present  the  fascinating  possibilities  and  impossibilities  of
computability. We make clear the Zeitgeist which led Alan Turing in 1950 to prophesy the advent of
intelligent machines within half a century. Then we connect Turing's notion of computability with
4 For an amusing analysis of optimistic A.I. research in dire straits, see pp. xx-xxxv in Dreyfus (1972).
5 Cole, David, "The Chinese Room Argument",  The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2014 Edition),
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/chinese-room/>. 
6 In this project we follow Searle's lead in mainly being concerned with the limits and possibilities of Strong A.I.
However,  as we shall see later in the sections dealing with the Chinese Room argument, Searle's definition of
Strong A.I. or “a real mind” is not without issues, as it is unclear whether Searle means phenomenal consciousness
or just mental states in general.
7 Horst,  Steven,  "The Computational  Theory of  Mind",  The Stanford  Encyclopedia  of  Philosophy  (Spring 2011
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/computational-mind/>. 
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his optimistic foresight on artificial intelligence and outline the Turing test.
In  the  second  part  of  this  project,  we  outline  John  Searle's  Chinese  Room  argument  and
challenge Alan Turing's idea of intelligent machines on philosophical grounds. The Chinese Room
shows how a computing system devoid of semantics lacks intentionality, which is a prerequisite for
human-like intelligence. With Searle we find a much more pessimistic view on the prospects of
strong  A.I.,  namely  that  there  aren't  any  genuine  prospects  of  success.  Strong  A.I.  through
computational information processing remains impossible. In this section we focus on Searle's key
notion of intentionality and how his notion of pre-linguistic intentionality precludes the existence of
intelligence (artificial or not) built on syntactic language alone.
In the third and final part we focus on Searle's critics and admirers. Here our purpose is twofold:
to make readily available various different viewpoints regarding the Chinese Room argument and
the viability of Strong A.I., and to wrap up the project with a discussion, where we offer our own
ideas on the topic. We draw on insights from Hubert Dreyfus, Bram van Heuveln and Maurice
Merleau-Ponty. Dreyfus is a stout critic of the possibility of Strong A.I. and is thus a natural ally to
Searle. Van Heuveln, on the other hand, argues for and defends Computationalism as a viable theory
of  mind.  Merleau-Ponty  writes  in  a  continental,  phenomenological  tradition,  which  supports
embodiment as essential to cognition and phenomenal consciousness.
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The Alan Turing Machine, the computable and the 
uncomputable
What is computability?
According to Boolos, Burgess & Jeffrey (2007)8 a function “is effectively computable if there are
definite, explicit rules by following which one could in principle compute its value for any given
arguments” (Boolos et al 2007:23). This means that (1) for every effectively computable function f,
a value  f(n) can be computed for a given  n; (2) the function should have definite, explicit rules,
meaning that the value  f(n) shall be found out only by reference to the function in question; and
finally (3) it plays no role whether it is practically possible to compute a value f(n) due to real-life
limits such as time required for the computation, the size of the intermediate or final output or speed
of the computer9. Boolos et al deal with a broader, more universal notion of computability because
this makes clear what distinguishes computable from uncomputable functions. As we shall see later,
uncomputable  functions'  defining  characteristic  is  precisely  that  even  disregarding  real-life
limitations, they remain mathematically impossible to compute (Boolos et al 2007:23-24).
Alan Turing defines a number as computable “if its decimal can be written down by a machine…
those [numbers] whose decimals are calculable by finite means” (Turing 1936:230-231)10. It is the
contention of Alan Turing that every effectively computable function is computable on a Turing
Machine, that is, Turing compatible. This is also called the Church-Turing thesis, which Boolos et
al defend. It is important to note that Boolos  et al stress, that there is no definitive  proof  that a
(properly programmed) Turing machine may compute all effectively computable functions. There
remains only the intuitive notion that every effectively computable function f can be translated into
code run by the Alan Turing machine.
What is the Alan Turing machine then? From the outset it is important to differentiate between
the Turing machine as a general concept of computability, and individual Turing machines serving
as computers of certain functions. Here we deal first with the Turing machine as a general concept
of computability, and specify the importance of the individual, unique Turing machines afterwards.
The  Turing  Machine  is  an  “idealized  machine  for  carrying  out  computations”,  and  can  be
understood consisting of three basic but essential parts: A potentially infinite memory tape divided
into blank squares; a moving 'head' which has read/write access to the memory tape and on which it
can move unhindered about; and a finite list of instructions which dictates the rules of conduct of
the head on the tape (Turing 1936:231-233, Boolos et al 2007:24-26). We shall deal with each of
these components in turn.
The  squares  on  the  memory tape  can  hold  but  one  of  two different  symbols,  0  or  1  (also
8 Computability and Logic. George S. Boolos, John P. Burgess & Richard C. Jeffrey. Cambridge University Press.
Fifth Edition. 2007.
9 Note  that  'computer'  in  this  context  only means  'entity which  computes',  and not  the modern day equivalent!
Turing's use of the word in his 1936 paper can appear strange to contemporary readers, as the definition covers
humans – who carry out calculations – and automated calculating machines equally.
10 Turing, Alan M. ”On computable numbers, with an application to the Entscheidungsproblem” (1936)  Journal of
Math 58.345-363: 5.
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sometimes known as B or | , S0 or S1, etc.). The memory tape is wholly blank by default, meaning
that every square on the tape has the symbol 0 by default. The arguments and values as well as
intermediate calculations of a given Turing Machine are represented in tally or monadic notation
(e.g. 1=I, 2=II […] 5=IIIII, etc.). Every integer is thus represented on the tape as a long string of
squares  holding  the  symbol  1,  with  a  single  blank  square  (holding  symbol  0)  indicating  gaps
between two or more integers on the tape.
The head has complete freedom of movement, but moves only one square at a time. It can read
or write to every square on the tape, but only when the head is positioned straight above the square,
it intends to read or write to. It can recognise the two different symbols as distinct, meaning it will
never mistake a symbol 1 for a symbol 0, or vice versa11. Finally it has the ability to erase a symbol
on a given square and write a new symbol. The head can change a 0 to a 1 and vice versa. In short,
the head has four main functions it can utilise: Move Left; Move Right; Read Square; and Write (0
or 1) to Square.
Finally, the list of instructions can be thought of as an exhaustive guide for the head on how to
approach the tape. The list of instructions is finite, meaning that there is a finite number of steps in
the computation done by the Turing Machine12.  Each instruction is  ordered,  meaning that  each
instruction is distinct (but not necessarily different) from one another. The instructions take the form
of a basic (but powerful!) “what if?”-table: each instruction dictates what to do depending on the
symbol of the square,  that the head is  currently reading. Remember that the head has but four
functions at  its  disposal.  Each instruction determines which one of the four functions the head
should use. Each instruction also contains a reference to which instruction should be executed after
it itself, the current one, is done. For example, an instruction for a given Turing Machine might read
'if the current square holds a 1, erase it and write 0, go to instruction q5. If the current square holds a
0, on the other hand, then leave it be and go one square left.  In this case, go to instruction q6'
(Turing 1936:231-233, Boolos et al 2007:24-26).
Even with such a simple contraption, Turing argues, it is possible to compute every effectively
computable function. While there is no definitive mathematical proof of this Church-Turing Thesis,
there remains a substantial amount of evidence for it13. Boolos et al therefore accept the challenge
and argue for the Turing Thesis by way of examples and intuition, starting with the creation of
simpler Turing machines and the continuation to complex ones.
An adding machine, adding 3+2 for example, is easy to create in Turing machine terms14. It is
simply a matter of instructing the Turing machine (starting on the leftmost 1 on this example tape,
11  For a detailed description of distinguishing symbols, see “Automated Formal Systems” pp. 47-86 in Haugeland
(1985).
12  Unless we are dealing with a “circular machine” (Turing 1936:233), where the machine, by looping endlessly, can
be said to have a potentially infinite number of executed steps if not stopped!
13 Note that the Church-Turing Thesis cannot be proven mathematically, see Boolos et al (2007). This is because there
is no precise definition of what “intuitively computable” means. The Church-Turing Thesis is perhaps better viewed
as a remarkably robust attempt at explicating this pre-theoretical concept.
14 A careful reader will note that it appears that the Turing machine can only do calculation with  positive integers.
This limitation can easily remedied, however. For instance, let the number n be represented with n+1 on the tape of
the Turing machine, and it is now possible to represent the number 0 in the machine. Likewise it is possible to let
different numbers be represented in simple monadic notation. See Boolos  et al (2007) pp. 23-34 for a detailed
description of how how this is done with Turing machines.
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with the numbers 3 and 2 being represented in simple monadic notation):
…BBB 1 1 1 B 1 1 BBB…
(1) to go right, seeking out the first blank square between the two numbers –
…BBB 1 1 1 B 1 1 BBB…
– and writing a 1 there –
…BBB 1 1 1 1 1 1 BBB…
(2) to head right until a blank is reached and stop there
…BBB 1 1 1 1 1 1 BBB…
(3) to move one step to the left
…BBB 1 1 1 1 1 1 BBB…
– and remove the 1 there –
…BBB 1 1 1 1 1 B BBB…
and finally (4) to move to the left until reaching a blank, then moving one step to the right, thereby
finishing in standard configuration by resting on the first 1 on the tape:
…BBB 1 1 1 1 1 BBB…
– now holding the sum of the two added numbers: 3+2 = 5
Note that each of the four ordered steps shown above corresponds to instructions, which can be
unambiguously understood and carried out by the Turing machine described above. From here on
and  out  it  is  just  a  matter  of  continuing  to  build  further  upon  this  foundation.  A multiplying
machine, for example, is just the adding machine built on top of it self with an external counter.
This can also be done on a Turing machine. An exponential  machine is a multiplying machine
added onto itself, which is also possible (if somewhat tedious) on a Turing machine, etc. (Boolos et
al: 2007:23-34). Central is the idea that the general concept of the Turing machine allows for an
infinite  amount  of  different  instruction sets,  thereby creating an infinite  list  of  different  Turing
machines.
In addition, the set of Turing machines are enumerable, meaning that there is an infinite list of
Turing machines which can be listed one after another on a gap-less list. This Boolos et al prove by
dissolving  the  'code',  or  programming  language  if  you  will,  of  Turing  Machines  into  unique
numerical descriptors to the power of prime numbers. The most simple Alan Turing machine is first
on the list, with its unique descriptor representing the shortest Alan Turing programming possible
within  the  language.  From this  starting  point  it  is  possible  to  list  every  possible  Alan  Turing
Machine in in an unending (countably infinite) list.
There is a snag however. While every possible Turing Machine can be listed in order, this does
not guarantee that every listed Turing Machine is a valid one, that is, corresponds to an effectively
computable function. In between the Turing Machines on the list, which corresponds to effective
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computable functions,  there will  be countless Turing Machines which do not.  We can certainly
imagine it to be possible to test the first few Turing machines on the list, provided they are not too
large or complicated. After a while, however, it does become more difficult to determine whether a
Turing machine is actually calculating some effectively computable function. Without commentated
blueprints or coded illustrations, the instruction sets of each consequent Turing machine would soon
grow too long and unwieldy for the human mind to assess with complete certainty. Remember that
it does not suffice to test a given Turing Machine (or, what amounts to exactly the same thing, a
given function f) by giving it a single argument and letting it return a single value. In theory, each
and every value  n must be fed to the Turing Machine in order to recognise the (either partial or
absolute) range of the given function f. In other words, we lack a foolproof procedure which, in a
finite amount of steps and taking a finite amount of time, can tell whether any given Turing machine
corresponds to an effectively computable function. Or, what amounts to the same thing, a procedure
which will tell us if a given Turing machine will ever halt and output a value.
David Hilbert  (1862-1943),  the German mathematician who “contributed substantially to the
establishment of the formalistic foundations of mathematics”15, attempted to solve this particular
problem.  For  him,  the  problem  was  whether  it  was  possible  to  evaluate  every  mathematical
statement as true or false through the application of an “effective procedure”, that is, an algorithm
with a finite number of steps. Hilbert was driven by the question as to whether it was possible to
formalise (that is,  prove as valid or invalid) every single mathematical statement from a set  of
axioms. Kurt  Gödel (1906-1978) proved with his Completeness Theorem that every valid mathe-
matical formula of first order logic could be deducted by rules of inference, a list of axioms and a
list of previously proven proofs (Immerman 2015)16. Every time a new mathematical proof was
deemed valid,  in according with Gödel's Completeness Theorem, it  could be added to the ever
expanding list of proven proofs. However, while the Completeness Theorem shows that we are able
to list every logically valid mathematical formula, it says nothing about whether we can list all the
non-valid formulae.
Let us discuss this a little more. If a logical expression is not in the list proven as valid, it seems
we must either try to solve it by hand or go home empty handed. Is there perhaps an automated pro-
cedure which “allows for any given logical expression to decide by finitely many operations its
validity or satisfiability”? This Hilbert chose to call the 'Entscheidungsproblem', the “main problem
of mathematical logic” (Immerman 2015).
Alan Turing himself explored this issue in his 1936 paper – “On computable numbers, with an
application  to  the  Entscheidungsproblem” – and proved that  such a  procedure would  never  be
invented17. Turing proved that every Turing Machine could be run on a single, Universal Turing
15 "David Hilbert"  Encyclopaedia  Britannica.  Encyclopaedia  Britannica  Online  Academic  Edition.  Encyclopædia
Britannica Inc., 2015. Web. 27 Apr. 2015. <http://academic.eb.com/EBchecked/topic/265698/David-Hilbert>. 
16 Immerman, Neil, "Computability and Complexity", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2015 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/computability/>.
17 This also shows that it is not possible to write a Turing Machine which can list all the (infinitely many) non-valid
formulae.  We see  this  as  follows:  Gödel's  Completeness  Theorem essentially tells  us  that  we can  list  all  the
infinitely many valid formulae. This means that if we had a hypothetical  non-validity “lister”, say an automated
machine, then we could build a composite machine that  could solve the Entscheidungsproblem. This machine
would simply be the combination of the validity and the non-validity listers.
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Machine. The Universal Turing Machine would take at least two inputs: the 'code'  of the given
Turing Machine and the input(s) of said Turing Machine. If for every computable function there
exists a comparable Turing machine, the Universal Turing Machine would essentially function in
accordance with Gödel's Completeness Theorem: Every computable function is listed as effectively
computable if the corresponding Turing Machine halts in the correct position and outputs a value.
The given Turing machine is then added to the list over valid Turing machines. What the Universal
Turing Machine cannot do, however, is determine whether a given Turing Machine will ever halt,
I.e. if a given function is effectively computable. Given a finite amount of time the Universal Turing
Machine cannot effectively tell the difference between a Turing machine with an abnormally long
runtime, and an actually looping, non-halting program. If the given Turing machine were to be
found halting in the correction configuration or – what amounts to the same thing – if the given
function were found to be valid, we might never know (Turing 1936, Immerman 2015).
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Alan Turing and the Turing Test
Alan Turing,  alongside other giants such as David Hilbert,  Kurt Gödel and Alonzo Church, all
helped define a complete new branch of mathematical logic. Alan Turing  et al essentially carved
themselves out a completely new space in which computation could be studied,  automated and
expanded upon. Turing himself might have thought that he was treading new ground for the first
time, grasping at a new field while wielding only unproven, pre-theoretical concepts. 
The Turing machine-concept of computability also provided a language in which problems could
be thought of as effectively solvable within automated systems given the right instructions. This had
huge implications not only for mathematical logic and what we now know as computer science, but
also for other scientific fields such as psychology and cognitive science. If the human brain could
be  thought  of  as  a  computing  system,  the  human  mind  could  perhaps  be  thought  of  as
computational. What is computable can be solved, given the right programming. Perhaps the mind
is software?
These two factors may explain the self-evident nature of Turing's bold claim about intelligence in
his 1950 paper. As we shall see below, it is striking how few actual positive arguments Turing puts
forth  in  his  defence  of  the  inevitability of  intelligent  machines.  Alan  Turing  was certainly not
discouraged by the halting problem or other inherent limits of the automated computers.
How do we deem a computer or machine to be intelligent? This is the question posed in Alan
Turing's paper “Computing Machinery and Intelligence” (1950)18. For Turing the question is best
answered by letting the machine or computer in question be subjected to a so-called Turing Test.
The test (or 'imitation game') is described as follows:
The new form of  the  problem can  be  described in  terms  of  a  game which  we  call  the
'imitation game'. It is played with three people, a man(A), a woman(B), and an interrogator
(C) who may be of either sex. The interrogator stays in a room apart from the other two. The
object of the game for the interrogator is to determine which of the other two is the man and
which is the woman. He knows them by labels X and Y, and at the end of the game he says
either 'X is A and Y is B' or 'X is B and Y is A'. The interrogator is allowed to put questions to A
and B thus:
C: Will X please tell me the length of his or her hair?
Now suppose X is actually A, then A must answer. It is A's object in the game to try and cause
C to make the wrong identification. His answer might therefore be
'My hair is shingled, and the longest strands are about nine inches long.'
In order that tones of voice may not help the interrogator the answers should be
written,  or  better  still,  typewritten.  The  ideal  arrangement  is  to  have  a  teleprinter
communicating  between  the  two  rooms.  Alternatively  the  question  and  answers  can  be
repeated by an intermediary. The object of the game for the third player (B) is to help the
interrogator. The best strategy for her is probably to give truthful answers. She can add such
things as 'I am the woman, don't listen to him!' to her answers, but it will avail nothing as the
man can make similar remarks.
18 Turing, Alan M. ”Computing Machinery and Intelligence” (1950). Mind, New Series, Vol. 59, No. 236 (Oct., 1950),
pp. 443-460. Oxford University Press.
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We now ask the question, 'What will happen when a machine takes the part of A in
this game?' Will the interrogator decide wrongly as often when the game is played like this as
he does when the game is played between a man and a woman? These questions replace our
original, 'Can machines think?' (Turing 1950:433-434)
Turing's intent is to test the intellectual – and not the physical – capabilities of the interrogated.
The format allows for an inclusion of almost “any one of the fields of human endeavour that we
wish to include”, while excluding points of comparison that make little sense, e.g. rating a machine
in  a  beauty  contest  or  comparing  an  athlete's  running  speed  to  that  of  an  aeroplane  (Turing
1950:435). In any case, it is assumed that the best course of action for the machine is to “provide
answers that would naturally be given by a man” (Turing 1950:435).
Turing also assumes that the 'thinking machine' in question to be a digital or electronic computer,
disregarding human clones as viable candidates in the Turing test. While it appears drastic to restrict
the imitation game to only digital computers, Turing assures us that this isn't so. In doing so he turns
his attention to “the nature and properties of these computers”. What follows is the first key point in
defining Turing's concept of 'intelligent'  and how machines have the capability to be intelligent
(Turing 1950:436).
Turing's definition of a digital computer mirrors that of his definition of the Turing machine: The
digital computers are machines that “are intended to carry out any operation which could be done
by a human computer” (Turing 1950436). Like a human computer, fixed rules must be followed
without deviation, these rules might be provided through a given book or list of instructions, and the
calculator has an unlimited supply of paper to do and store calculations (Turing 1950:436-437).
By referring to Charles Babbage's (fl. 1829-1839 at the University of Cambridge) “Analytical
Engine”, which was supposed to run using only mechanical parts such as wheels and cards, Turing
deduces that the medium in which the digital computer is created in is of no theoretical importance
in defining the digital computer. Turing notes that it is an understandable but ill-fated fallacy to
mistake electricity for a defining characteristic of a digital computer, even if electricity plays a vital
role in both the human nervous systems as well as in contemporary electronic computers (Turing
1950:439).
Digital computers fall within the class of 'discrete state machines'. Discrete states simply means
that a given machine has a finite number of discrete internal states that it can be in19. The basic
example is the light-switch, which has two discrete states, on and off. While the physical set-up of
the light switch might have countless intermediate positions, to the system, which controls the light,
only the two opposite discrete states matter. This has the added bonus of making predicting the
machine's  future states  much easier.  In a discrete  state machine it  is  reasonable to  assume that
“knowledge of the state at one moment” will yield a  “reasonably accurate knowledge any number
of steps later” (Turing 1950:440). Digital computers, Turing remarks, have the capacity to contain
an enormous number  of  such internal  states.  Thus,  a  digital  computer,  given adequate  storage,
capacity and speed, would be able to imitate “the behaviour of any discrete state machine” in the
imitation game (Turing 1950:441). A digital computer is a universal machine precisely because of
this capability (Turing 1950:441-442).
19 Turing's machines are therefore discrete machines.
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The question can thus be restated once more in more detail: Are there imaginable discrete state
machines  – run on a  digital  computer  –  which  would  do  well  in  the  imitation  game? (Turing
1950:442) This Turing believes to be a possibility, as he sees no good arguments against the notion
of thinking machines, i.e., the notion of a digital computer passing the Turing test. Turing deals
extensively with various objections because he has “no very convincing arguments of a positive
nature to support my views” (Turing 1950:454). For our purposes especially two objections are of
import, the mathematical objection and the consciousness objection.
The  mathematical  objection  goes  to  the  heart  of  the  problem  of  uncomputable  functions
presented  earlier.  The objection is  built  on the  idea,  that  discrete-state  machines  are  inherently
limited due to the inherent limitation of computability. For instance, we can imagine asking the
interrogated machine to evaluate whether another discrete-state machine would ever answer 'Yes' to
any question.  If  the discrete-state machine in question were to be a circular  machine,  i.e.  non-
halting, the interrogated machine would be in the same situation as a Universal Turing machine
trying to determine the validity of a circular Turing machine. Turing notes,
“when the machine described bears a certain comparatively simply relation to the machine
which  is  under  interrogation,  it  can  be  shown  that  the  answer  is  either  wrong  or  not
forthcoming.  This  is  the  mathematical  result:  it  is  argued  that  it  proves  a  disability  of
machines to which the human intellect is not subject” (Turing 1950:445).
As a counter-argument Turing appeals to Man's fallacious intellect,  noting that even humans
make  wrong  answers.  Even  if  an  intelligent  machine  would  have  an  inherent  limitation  in  its
intellect, it wouldn't take anything away from its magnificent ability, as the human intellect would
certainly seem to have its own fair share of limitations. Recognising the limitations on machine
intelligence must be accompanied by the recognition of the limitations on human intelligence. A
human might  prove  him or  herself  better  than  one machine,  but  this  occasion  would  not  be a
simultaneous triumph over all machines (Turing 1950:445). Turing dismisses this objection, noting
that while some men might be cleverer than some machines, the reverse might also be the case. 
But won't every machine in existence, by virtue of being  founded on computability, have  this
inherent  limitation? Turing states that the defeat of one machine does not mean the defeat of all
machines, but surely all  machines by definition(!), must fail at the halting problem?  This point
Turing does little to cover.
The consciousness objection, on the other hand, echoes a key issue within the philosophy of
mind: What makes a system conscious, and why should a 'thinking machine' be a conscious system?
Turing's chosen objector, Professor Jefferson, makes the case that machines cannot have conscious
thought because they do not possess human qualities, thoughts or emotions. Turing quotes:
“Not until  a machine can write a sonnet or compose a concerto because of thoughts and
emotions felt, and not by the chance fall of symbols, could we agree that machine equals
brain...” (Turing 1950:445-446).
Turing admits that it is impossible to tell whether a thinking machine is conscious or not. But
Turing warns that it is impossible to recognise conscious thought even in our fellow man, as the
only epistemological claim we have to consciousness is from an individual, first person perspective.
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To demand positive proof of consciousness of a thinking machine would require one to demand
exactly the same from every fellow man and woman. This would be impossible. In other words,
proponents of this type of argument against thinking machines would end up in a most untenable
solipsist position. Turing, not without irony, notes that he appreciates the convention that persons in
everyday life are recognised as most likely conscious, even if we cannot know for certain. As to the
consciousness of the particular thinking machine in question, we would have to ask it.
“In short, then, I think that most of those who support the argument from consciousness
could be persuaded to abandon it rather than be forced into a solipsist position. They will
then probably be willing to accept our test.” (Turing 1950:445-447)
Here, Turing shifts the burden of proof. The objector in question must prove that consciousness
exists, as well as provide a positive method of recognising its existence to an external party. Only
then can Turing take seriously the objection that a thinking machine does not have mental states, as
there would then be an actual point of comparison. However, one could shift back the burden of
proof  and demand that  Turing  demarcate  where and when consciousness  arises  in  any system.
Would a simple program outputting “I AM” in an endless stream of lines, for example, qualify as
conscious under Turing's convention?
Also a key question touched upon here is how one deems a system conscious on the basis of
observed, external behaviour alone. According to philosophers such as David Chalmers (1996) and
Ned  Block  (1978)  it  is  an  intuitive  idea  that  two  systems  can  be  functionally  (physically,
biologically) identical, and show exactly the same external behaviour (personality, conduct, etc.),
but be conscious and unconscious respectively. The notion of an ordinary human being actually
being  such  a  'zombie'  is  intuitive  and  imaginable,  Chalmers  argues,  wherefore  the  functional
configuration of a thinking machine and a human being cannot account alone for the emergence of
consciousness (Chalmers 1996).
This  chapter  has  served  as  a  brief  overview  of  Alan  Turing's  concept  of  computability,
uncomputability and the imitation game. While intelligent machines have inherent limitations due
to the nature of the computation they are founded on, Alan Turing was not in the least discouraged
from heralding the advent of truly intelligent machinery. Turing's imitation game is presented as an
unproblematic test for detecting artificial intelligence, even if it  remains unclear whether Turing
deems the thinking machine to be exhibiting strong or weak A.I. Turing doesn't present any positive
arguments for the notion of intelligent machines, and he does seem to understate the objections
given.  Rather  than  dealing  in  detail  with  the  objection  as  to  whether  a  thinking  machine  is
conscious,  Turing berates  his  opponent  for  solipsism and refers  to  the Turing test  as  a  natural
solution. As already stated, this may in part be due to the influence of the particular Zeitgeist of the
post war period, where positive arguments for the self-evident and obvious project of A.I. weren't
necessary.
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Modern Automated Formal Systems
What is a computer? according to John Haugeland a computer is an interpreted20 automatic formal
system.
Firstly formal systems can be compared to games. In games tokens are manipulated by certain
rules in order to see what configurations are possible in order to win the game or for some other
purpose. It is possible to have different types of tokens, which can be manipulated in accordance to
the same rule set ex. in the game of chess the operations of a queen is different to that of a pawn.
This comparison is due to John Haugeland. A game is dependent upon certain “legal moves” (a rule
set/list of instructions) where a defined set of “pieces” (Tokens), can be manipulated in a fixed
number of ways. Manipulating a token can be done in 4 ways (p. 48):
1. Relocate them (e.g. moving them around on some board or playing field).
2. Altering them (or replacing them with different ones)
3. Adding new ones to the position; and/or
4. Taking some away.
In other words formal systems are a “self-contained”. They are token manipulation games, where
the instructions should require no external source of information and should require no ingenuity to
compute. The operations in a formal system should be programmable to be used by a machine or
computer. 
An  example  is  the  game  of  chess.   The  game  starts  from  a  starting  position,  a  defined
configuration of the chess pieces (different types of tokens), where one step at a time the pieces can
be moved and interact with each other in accordance with some legal moves. It is a self-contained
system within which only the chess pieces themselves and the configuration are relevant for the
game itself. This point is similar to that of a computer, where some of its functions or parts are
identified  as  its  tokens,  which  are  then  manipulated  automatically  by  the  system.  A computer
follows the rules of a formal system, but does this automatically. Accordingly meaning is irrelevant
to the system as it is not dependent upon an outside influence or defined meaning, as these are not
relevant to the function of the system (Haugeland, 1989: 50). Ex. if the system were to translate a
language, the meaning of its individuals parts would not be relevant, since it work according to a
certain rule set. The manipulation of symbols are immediate to the system.
Denomination of Value
This leads  to the second point.  A digital  system is  a set  of positive write/read techniques.  The
write/read techniques are positive. They are absolute and capable of ex. relocating a token within
20 Interpretation means in this sense to specify the meaning of tokens and systems of marks. Specification takes place
in  two steps,  First  deciding  what  the  simple  symbols  mean,  and  secondly  decide  how complex  symbols  are
determined by their composition. The interpretation is conducted in accordance with a rule book that translates
symbols of one system to another system in a coherent way (Haugeland, 1989: 93-94) The symbols makes sense as
they are translatable from a system that we do not understand to another that we do. In relation to the use of a
computer we interpret symbols in the manner stated above. 
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the system without  qualification i.e.  the system is  not  relative or  dependent  upon some partial
results outside the system. 
A formal  system is  digital,  in  the  sense,  that  the  range  of  commands,  that  can  result  in  a
manipulation of tokens permits a denomination of sets to an exact value. This is comparable to the
denomination of monetary value to a piece of copper or paper. Even though the note may have
writing or some wear and tare it is still worth its denominated value. The command is reliable to
reach success within the system. 
In other words if we refer to the possible ways of manipulating a system we can talk about
”reading” and “writing” techniques. When reading a token a value is recognised and in accordance
to the given set of rules (possibly complex) a token can ex. be written in its place, relocate it etc.
(Haugeland,1989: 54) A consequence of the systems self-containment is that it is possible to speak
of some absolute value, that are not dependent upon outside influence. It is possible to process
information and reach a reliable result. 
This  is  clearly relevant  to  the discussion of the previous  chapter:  Turing Machines are very
clearly formal systems. But it is also relevant to A.I.. If we are to create an artificial intelligent agent
it should be able to accommodate itself i.e. find a relative position from a digital formal system. An
example could be how one would play ping pong. A human being is capable of taking into account
a broad range of information by which it can make its choice of action. A complex situation like
ping pong would require a system that is reliable and positive to a certain margin of error i.e. that it
can read an input (position of token) and act by writing another token and later read the same token
to  see  what  actions  are  now possible  i.e.  to  process  some information  into  a  mechanical  arm
(Haugeland, 1989: 54). A human ping pong player approximates her shots, but are reliable if her
skill is high, despite this the selected actions for returning the ball are approximations. With respect
to formal systems the exact token doesn’t matter, as long as it remains within tolerances. A digital
formal system allows due to its nature the possibility of perfection due to the absolute value of the
tokens. 
It should therefore be possible in this sense to create an artificial system, that acts in accordance
with a deterministic rule set. It is possible to denominate a system that can act and react to certain
configurations of the system itself. The system is “medium independent” in the sense that it can be
materialised in ex. different materials without consequence to the system itself.
Algorithms
Equally it is possible to speak of formally equivalent systems. This means that it  is possible to
“couple”  a  number  of  distinct  formal  systems.  If  there  for  each  system  is  a  corresponding
interchangeable position, whenever a move is legal in one system is also legal in the other and all
the starting positions correspond (Haugeland, 1989: 62). 
This leads to the idea of complex systems. By complex it is meant that some operation within a
formal system can be processed across a number of systems and procedures. So even though a
formal system is finitely playable it is possible to compute an increasing amount of information. In
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other words it possible to create an increasingly complex system from some primitive operations
(Haugeland, 1989: 64-65).
This creates some possibilities. The rules of a formal system can be built into an algorithm. An
algorithm is an infallible step-by-step recipe for obtaining a prespecified result (Haugeland, 1989:
65). It is a  procedure guaranteed to produce the desired result in a finite number of steps. That is
that  the  algorithm describes  one  step  at  a  time,  where  after  each  step  the  next  step  is  fully
determined and that after each step the next step is obvious. It is equally possible to create what is
called second-level algorithms, that consist of a range of lower level algorithms. 
Summing up formal systems makes it is possible to create increasingly complex systems that can
partake in designing a reliable method of solving problems. An initial set of primitive instruction
can from a prespecified list allow one to follow a finite set instructions to a result. The next step
depend upon the previous steps of the system. A finite would player would therefore be capable of
reaching a certain result from some preliminary information.
20/05/15 19/48
Searle's Chinese Room argument
If Alan Turing stood for the unbounded enthusiasm of the early post-war period for the project of
A.I., it was John Searle who in 1980 came to represent the stark opposition against this enthusiasm.
Searle's so-called Chinese Room argument21 is a very compelling argument against the notion of
“Strong A.I.”22. The aim of this section is to outline and clarify what the Chinese Room argument is,
to explore Searle's notion of intentionality in detail and to briefly present the common counter-
replies to Searle's argument.
Searle argues for two propositions. First that intentionality in human beings and animals are due
to causal processes in the brain, which means that brains are capable at producing intentionality
through their functional organisation. Secondly, Searle argues that it is not possible for a computer
programme by itself to have such intentionality. This means that computer programmes are able to
manipulate input to a certain output, but that this does not entail any intentionality similar to that of
a human or animal mind. Searle seeks to test this second proposition by asking how his own mind
would work if it worked by the principles that guide a computer programme. The Chinese Room
argument works as a thought experiment and reads as follows:
An English speaking person, unfamiliar to the Chinese language, is locked in a room. In the
room is a rule book, which provides rules for translating Chinese symbols into English, called “the
program”. The person in the room is given three batches of Chinese symbols. The first batch is
called “a script”,  the second “a story” and the third “questions”. The responses that the person
provides a collected in a fourth batch called “answers to the questions”. Over time the person is
given questions and provide answers by reading the Chinese symbols, following the instructions of
the rule books and writing another Chinese symbol as an answer to the question.
The person has no understanding of the Chinese language. However over time it is possible for
the person to utilise the rule books and manipulate with the symbols to answer in a manner almost
identical  to  a  regular  Chinese  speaker.  The person is  able  to  manipulate  uninterpreted  Chinese
symbols to a degree, so that an external reader would be unable to distinguish between the answers
of the person in the room and a native Chinese speaker. Searle thereby notes that the person is a
mere instantiation of a computer programme, for the purpose of translating Chinese (Searle 1980:3).
From this  argument  Searle  concludes  two  points.  First  that  the  person  in  the  room has  no
understanding of Chinese. Even though both input and output – that is the “questions” and the
“answers to the questions” – are immediately understandable to a native Chinese speaker outside
the  room,  the  man in  the  room understands  nothing,  as  he  is  just  'going through the  motions'
21 The argument was originally put forward by John Searle his article ”Minds, Brains, and Programs” published 1980
in Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-457.
22 Searle distinguishes between a notion of weak and strong A.I..  The former refers to the use of computers and
programmes as tools to help understand the human mind, while the latter refers to the position, that a properly
programmed computer can be seen as a mind in itself, i.e. a computer programme can have cognitive states, similar
to those of human beings and animals (Searle 1980). Searle's Chinese Room argument revolves around disproving
the  possibility of  a  mind which  “can  be  literally said  to  understand  and  have  other  cognitive  states”  (Searle
1980:2*). It is unclear, however, whether Searle intends this definition to include phenomenal consciousness or not.
This point will be discussed in more detail in the next section.
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following a rule book for how the symbols are to be read (not understood!), processed and written23.
In  other  terms,  a  computer  manipulating  symbols  through  a  formal  system  will  have  no
understanding of the information that it is processing. Secondly, in continuation of the first point, a
computer programme is not in itself sufficient for explaining human understanding, as it lacks the
causal organisation needed to produce intentionality.  There is no semantic understanding of the
information or symbols involved within the system itself.
Searle  argues  that  there  is  a  tendency  to  confuse  strong  A.I.  with  weak  A.I.  by  virtue  of
attributing intentionality to weak A.I.: computers and programmes are tools and we extend our own
intentionality to them. The confusion is a moot point to Searle's argument, however, as Searle is
only concerned with whether an artificial intelligence on its own can have intentionality and thereby
understanding and cognitive states. But this raises an important point. If intentionality is important
to intelligence, it is fruitful to understand in detail in what context Searle has hatched the concept of
intentionality, and how this context plays into his argument against strong A.I.
Searle’s concept of intentionality
In his 2009 article “What is Language?: Some Preliminary Remarks”24 Searle seeks to describe how
the structure of language is connected to pre-linguistic intentionality. In the article Searle argues that
language is not just syntax, but also relies on some fundamental biological functions. Language is
due to evolution, which has given us the ability to relate to the world. We are connected to the world
in a meaningful way due to an intrinsic sense of perception, intention, belief, desire and some form
of memories (Searle 2009:179). These characteristics are fundamental to the mind and language if
one is an intelligent agent roaming the world. In other words, human beings, as well as animals, are
connected to an outside world from their own position. They carry within themselves the conditions
of satisfaction to how their position is connected to the outside world.
In this sense we carry within ourselves, prior to language, a propositional content to the world
where from meaning is created. The term intentionality denotes that we, as biological beings, have
some  fundamental  neurological  structures  that  give  rise  to  an  intentional  mind.  This  mind  is
intentional to the world as it intrinsic to itself contains beliefs, desires, intentions, which are meant
to connect it to an outside world. As we are fundamentally connected to an outside world, Searle
argues, the formal structure of language is due to the propositional content of the mind, conditions
of satisfaction, psychological mode, and direction of fit (Searle 2009:180).
Our biology allows us to relate to the world in a meaningful way in relation to how we would
like the world to be. The mind have a propositional content with how it would like the world to be.
Therefore intentional desires can only be fulfilled or frustrated, not true or false25. They contain
within themselves the conditions of satisfaction. An intentional mind, in connection with its mental
23 This ties back to the instruction table of Alan Turing's machine and J. Haugeland's automated formal system.
24 Searle, John R. "What is Language: Some Preliminary Remarks" (2009)
25 From the description one can perhaps derive how intentionality as a concept is incompatible with the discrete,
formal nature of computability. Can the output of a given Turing machine be 'fullfilled' or 'frustrated' instead of
some output having the meaning 'true' or 'false'? It is certainly possible to agree by convention that a given value (in
monadic  notation)  outputted  by  a  Turing  machine  should  represent  'frustration',  but  then  we'd  be  guilty  of
attributing intentionality to a purely syntactic system, as warned by Searle.
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content, therefore have a direction of fit. Belief refers to a mind-to-world direction of fit, and desires
refers to world-to-mind direction of fit (Searle 2009: 180-181).
Accordingly, if strong A.I. is to become a reality, then the computer in question should already in
its cognition have notions of space, time, causation, agency and object. It has to have identity and
individuation together with property and relation (Searle, 2009: 181). In other words, for a artificial
intelligence to have intentionality – that is, for a computer to have a pre-linguistic consciousness or
something prerequisite for language acquisition – it should be able to accommodate itself in the
world by aforementioned features. For a computer to have a consciousness similar to that of an
animal  it  doesn’t  necessarily have to  have lingual  concepts  or images  corresponding to certain
terms,  but  it  should be  able  to  understand itself  in  relation to  things  around it  and understand
causation. An A.I. would be unable to understand or have a meaningful sense of, for example, a
dog’s  anticipation  for  it  meal  (“She’s  pouring  my food  into  my bowl,  that  must  be  for  me”)
compared to the idea that the meal on her plate is hers (if the dog is  well  trained).  The dog’s
intentionality positions itself with the actions of something happening around it and relates that to
itself, whereby meaning is created.
The consequence of this for a discussion of strong A.I. is that if we are only talking symbol
manipulation, that is, syntax without meaning, then the artificial intelligence or mind in question
would be lacking. Searle argues that consciousness could be present before linguistic syntax, and
that our biological prerequisite for thought and intentionality is bound to our biology. Ontologically
we are placed in the world and relate to it via fundamental intentional structures26. Therefore, if we
are to speak of a human like mind, the conditions of satisfaction are connected to pre-linguistic
intentionality. Searle states that intentionality and language are connected to a state of things that
are not possible to presuppose in and of themselves. Lingual syntax does not provide the foundation
or the prerequisite for a mind, but it can give a more complex and rich structure. It is possible
through language to manipulate a syntactic system that contains semantic content. But an A.I. being
able to answer questions in a natural language or to pass a Turing test would not necessarily entail
the A.I. having understanding or cognitive states.
Additional arguments
An important point is Searle’s notion of information processing. Information processing entails, not
the  notion  of  intelligible  information,  but  symbol  manipulation.  A  computer  functions  by
manipulating unintelligible symbols to the machine itself, within an automated formal system. The
point being that it is the interpreter of the symbols that provides meaning. It is the human operator
of the system that provides the system within some type intentional meaning, not the machine itself.
In  this  connection  Searle  notes  that  Computationalism  works  from  a  residual  idea  of
behaviourism or operationalism. In behaviourism behaviour is held to be the central indication of
whether an animal is intelligent or not. In Computationalism, intelligence would be ascribed to a
26 Another way of putting this relation to the world through intentional structures is by noting how intentionality can
be said to manifests itself in social and institutional interaction through so-called speech acts (Searle 2009). Searle
writes “the creation of social and institutional ontology is due to linguistically presenting certain facts as existing,
thus creating the facts” (Searle, 2009: abstract).
20/05/15 22/48
machine on the basis of behaviour as would be a fellow human27. The computationalist model is still
not sufficient in explaining the phenomenological/psychological level28. In other words, the Chinese
Room argument points to a fundamental problem that even though a computer can simulate formal
features of different processes, the simulation does not entail that the discrete computational process
is what is essential for the mental (Searle, 1980: 13).
A computational approach to A.I. would, according to Searle, be a waste, since it is impossible to
produce a medium that can produce a mind, unless we can create an exact copy of a human or
animal  brain.  But  if  it  on the other  hand is  presumed that  it  is  possible  to  create  a mind in a
computer,  the  physical  body  wouldn’t  matter  to  the  process  of  mind.  Searle’s  point  is  that
physical/chemical properties of the human mind are maybe the prerequisite for mind (Searle, 1980:
13). It would therefore mean that there would be no interesting connection between the brain and
the mind. 
Searle  therefore  presupposes  that  the  brain  is  machine  that  have  the  ability  to  produce
intentionality. The brain has a causal capacity to create intentionality, but this would not be possible
for a computer to do, since as stated in the Chinese room argument a machine can instantiate a
computer programme but not create intrinsically have intentionality.
Replies and counter-replies to the Chinese Room argument
To conclude this section we list the common objections to Searle's argument and his counter-replies.
The Systems Reply in particular will be discussed further in the next section.
The Systems Reply. The person in the Chinese Room is as part of an entire system (including
the room itself, the pen, the paper, the rule book etc.) which allows him to translate a symbol to
another. There is a conjunction between different parts of the system, and through this conjunction
the system as a whole is capable of understanding Chinese. In other words, even if the individual
parts of a given system lack understanding, this does not preclude that the entire system can have
understanding.
Searle’s reply: If the person in the room internalises all the parts that make out the entire system
(i.e. the rule book, the pen, the paper, etc.), he would still be able to translate the messages, but he
would still have no understanding. This points to a difference between a translating system and a
native  Chinese  speaker.  Accordingly  there  should  be  a  difference  between  a  native  speaker’s
understanding of her language and the process of a machine. With respects to the Chinese room, we
are  talking  about  a  Chinese  symbol  manipulation  system that  works  from English  commands.
Accordingly the system would not understand a correspondence about for example pigeons and
trains in Chinese symbols, but would understand a process that “symbol 2” follows “symbol 1” etc.
Searle therefore argues for the existence of two very different systems. Two independent systems,
where one understands English and the other does not understand Chinese. In short, although the
man in the Chinese Room internalises all relevant parts of the room, he still  does not have the
meaning associated with each symbol, which a native speaker would have.
27 As noted above, this is the school of thought Alan Turing subscribes to in his 1950 paper.
28 As we shall see, the same point is made by Heuveln later in this project. Complex behaviour cannot be constitutive
of intelligence, only indicative of intelligence.
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The Robot Reply. We will design a computer programme, embody it and allow it to act in the
world around it. It would be able to drink, manipulate the world, walk, run etc. According to the
argument such a robot would have genuine understanding by virtue of its “bodily” connection to the
world around it, and mental states in accordance with the outside world.
Searle’s reply: This case would be similar to the Chinese room. Searle argues that the various
inputs of the robot are but new symbols for the Chinese Room to process, wherefore the processing
in  the  Chinese  Room remains  unchanged.  The  man  is  unaware  of  the  fact  that  the  symbolic
information given to him comes from a robot’s translation of input from a camera that is directed
towards the world around it and from a program that moves the robot’s arms and legs. Accordingly,
the new rules of the situation would be of no consequence to the robot’s understanding. 
The Brain Simulator Reply.  If  we copied the entire  abstract physical  topology of a native
Chinese speaker, that is if we copied his or her brain on a physical level, would this not mean that
we could create an artificial intelligence? Meanwhile we are able to run a range of programmes that
are similar to those that process information in the brain.
Searle’s reply: The pipe man reply. We can put a man in a room to operate a complicated set of
intertwined pipes with valves in them. He receives a range of Chinese symbols and follows a rule
book which states which valves he has to fire in order to translate the symbols. When all the right
pipes have been fired we have an illustration of how a physical process in the form of a synapse
firing can be done in same sense as the translation of language in a formal system. Does this entail
understanding on behalf of the man in the room? The argument follows that as long as it is only the
formal structure of the brain that is simulated, then it does not explain the causal powers of the
brain, that is, the ability of the brain to produce intentional mental states29.
Searle's Chinese Room argument as presented here is a very compelling argument. We shall deal
with a key criticism of the argument in the next section. Central to this critique is Searle's definition
of Strong A.I. and of intentionality, as unclarities in both concepts lead to logical inconsistencies in
the Chinese Room argument.
29 Note that the (pipe) man in question is no longer part of a computational system, but rather a causal facilitator. This
argument is taken up to consideration again in the Heuveln section.
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Bram van Heuveln's defence of Computationalism
Bram van  Heuveln,  clinical  assistant  professor  of  the  Department  of  Cognitive  Science  at  the
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute30, defends Computationalism, which states that “cognition is the
result  of  underlying  computational  processes”  (van  Heuveln  2000:1)31.  The  argument  of  van
Heuveln is twofold:
1. Cognition32 is  best  understood  in  terms  of  information  processing.  As  computation  is
information-processing,  it  is  reasonable  to  argue  that  cognition  is  the  result  of  some
underlying computational  processes.  Van Heuveln supports  this  argument  by noting that
both  computers  and  brains  can  be  thought  of  as  information-processing  systems,  and
showing that there is an irrefutable similarity in regards to the level of abstraction taking
place in brains and computers respectively (van Heuveln 2000:1).
2. If Searle's Chinese Room argument is sound, then Computationalism is false. Van Heuveln
builds upon the Systems Reply and argues that Searle's Chinese Room argument commits a
fallacy  of  composition,  i.e.  it  fails  to  factor  in  the  possibility  of  an  emergence of
intentionality from the underlying system. Van Heuveln also points to inconsistencies in
Searle's argument as to exactly  where the intentionality comes from: even if Searle holds
that the properties of a computational information-processing are not sufficient in generating
intentionality,  it  remains  unclear  why the  properties  of  physical  and chemical  processes
should generate intentionality. Finally, Van Heuveln argues that the Chinese Room argument
“leads to the conclusion that  no system can be intentional,” (van Heuveln 2000:98) which
appears to run contrary to our common experience.
In this section we will go over these two arguments in turn. The section concludes that while van
Heuveln's  argument  for  the  weak  claim  of  Computationalism  is  compelling,  it  encounters
difficulties when making the final link between cognition and computation. All is not lost however,
as  van  Heuveln  certainly  succeeds  in  his  goal  of  proving  a  plausible  connection  between
information-processing and cognition. Van Heuveln's criticism of Searle's Chinese Room argument
is to the advantage of the argument for Computationalism, as the weak claims of the Systems Reply
align well with the weak claim of Computationalism.
30 "Bram van Heuveln”, URL=<http://www.cogsci.rpi.edu/~heuveb/>, last accessed 05.05.15
31 Heuveln, Bram v. ”Emergence and Consciousness – Explorations into the Philosophy of Mind via the Philosophy of
Computation” (2000) Binghamton University, State University of New York.
32 Here it is important to note a recurring problem of defining 'intelligence' throughout the texts so far. For Turing, the
imitation game would reveal truly thinking machines on the basis of their performance. Thus Turing conflated
behaviour as indicative of intelligence with behaviour being constitutive of intelligence (van Heuveln 2000:44-46).
For  Searle,  the  Chinese  Room shows  that  a  purely  syntactical  system  cannot  have  any  understanding,,  thus
disproving Strong A.I.. According to van Heuveln, however, Searle fails to distinguish between mental properties in
general  and phenomenal (i.e.  conscious) states in his argument (van Heuveln 2000:87).  Van Heuveln therefore
assumes that Searle is “talking about the possibility of computational systems having psychological properties with
the  exclusion of  phenomenal  consciousness”  (van  Heuveln  2000:87,  emphasis  added).  Because  of  Searle's
confusion  in  regards  to  whether  the  Chinese  Room  argument  disproves  phenomenal  consciousness or  just
psychological properties in general, it our contention that Computationalism's weak claim is compatible with and in
support of Searle's definition of Strong A.I. if it is taken to mean the latter. See also Chalmers (1996) pp. 3-31 for an
in-depth discussion of the difference between the phenomenal and the psychological concept of mind.
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The argument for Computationalism
Computationalism means that cognition can be “understood and explained within a computational
framework”  (van Heuveln  2000:41).  What  is  cognition  then?  Van  Heuveln  traces  the  intuitive
notion that cognition or mental states are concepts, that ultimately derive from the explanation of
behaviour (van Heuveln 2000:41). While the behaviour of inanimate objects and animate objects
can  be  explained  in  mechanical  terms  and  biological  terms  respectively,  the  more  complex
behaviour, which is “especially exhibited by us humans”, requires reference to explanatory factors
outside “the typical mechanical, physical, biological, or chemical stories” (van Heuveln 2000:42).
Psychological  concepts  like  belief,  memories  and  learning  are  introduced  in  order  to  explain
complex behaviour (van Heuveln 2000:42)33.
According to van Heuveln, Alan Turing's imitation game is a set-up which exactly requires and
tests for complex behaviour. Thus, van Heuveln argues, not only did Turing manage to provide a
method of testing complex behaviour, which according to van Heuveln's definition would have to
be “indicative of intelligence” (van Heuveln 2000:44), Turing also managed to capture a kind of
behaviour  which  is  intuitively  associated  with  the  possession  of  cognitive  abilities,  namely
information  processing (van  Heuveln  2000:44-45).  Cognitive  abilities  are  not  revealed  by  the
physical abilities or features of a given physical system, but rather by the system's ability to process
information in many different  forms (van Heuveln 2000:45).  Trying to understand cognition in
terms of information-processing, van Heuveln notes, “is indeed widely accepted by psychologists
and artificial intelligence researchers alike” (van Heuveln 2000:45). Thus, van Heuveln argues, as
cognition is the vocabulary that was introduced in order to explain complex (human) behaviour,
information-processing and cognition must be one and the same thing (van Heuveln 2000:46). This
van Heuveln calls “the information-processing intuition” (van Heuveln 2000:45), which motivates
the computationalist thesis.
Now,  if  it  can  be  argued  that  computation is  information-processing,  then  the  link  between
cognition and computation is established. What, for example, makes a Turing machine capable of
processing information?  Van Heuveln  argues  that  the Turing machine  can certainly represent  a
multitude of information (only limited by the manner this information is interpreted) as well as
transform different representations of information into other representations. That is all there is to
information-processing,  meaning that any system, which has these two capabilities,  can process
information.
This has the consequence that the physical details of a given system remain unimportant to the
system's ability to process information. Information-processing can be done by any system in which
“certain abstract  differences  make some other  abstract  difference” (van Heuveln 2000:65).  Van
Heuveln finds it fruitful to borrow D. Chalmers' concept of “abstract functional organization” (van
Heuveln 2000:65), which states that
“...  as  long  as  we  retain  certain abstract  causal  relationships  between  the  individual
components [in a system] … their size, color, weight, location, and other physical properties
doesn't matter” (van Heuveln 2000:46).
33 Remember that these are all concepts which are tied intimately to Searle's notion of pre-linguistic intentionality.
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This ties back to Turing's original argument that physical details are of no theoretical importance
to the Turing machine. The Turing machine is medium independent and can be built out of almost
anything34. In other words, a Turing machine retains its functional organisation, even if its physical
properties can vary greatly.
Van Heuveln argues that because both computers and human brains exhibit this particular level
of abstraction – between the underlying physical processes and the abstract functional organisation
of the information-processing – there is good reason to believe that the information processing of
both types of systems are both the result of an instantiation of computation:
“[W]e... see that the instantiation of some computation gives rise to information-processing
properties. Therefore, if one's cognitive properties can be analyzed as information-processing
abilities,  then  one's  cognitive  properties  will  be  the  result  of  the  instantiation  of  some
computation” (van Heuveln 2000:45).
To sum up, van Heuveln's argument can be put like this: 
1. Information-processing is necessary for a system to exhibit complex behaviour. Cognition is
identical with information-processing, which is why human exhibit complex behaviour.
2. The brain is thus an information-processing system.
3. Turing  machines  and  computers  are  capable  of  processing  information  through
representation  and  transformation  of  representations  and  are  therefore  also  information-
processing systems.
4. Human  brains  and  Turing  machines  share  some  similarity  in  terms  of  the  nature  of
information-processing,  namely  that  the  functional  organisation  of  the  information-
processing appears to be independent of the physical properties of the underlying system in
both cases.
5. Therefore, the manner in which brains and computers process information must be alike.
6. Therefore, cognition must reduce to computations.
Van Heuveln notes several times that Computationalism is a weak claim, meaning that it does not
provide a “very fine-grained explanation of cognition” (van Heuveln 2000:69). Computationalism
only claims that certain computational processes must underlie cognition for cognition to exist (van
Heuveln  2000:69).  While  this  claim  is  purportedly  weak,  the  argument  has  non-trivial
repercussions. Therefore one issue at hand must be discussed, namely whether similarity equals
identity when it comes to information-processing systems.
Van Heuveln argues in a convincing fashion that information-processing  can be the result of
some  instance  of  computation  (van  Heuveln  2000:55-66).  However,  he  fails  to  answer  why
information-processing  is the result of some instance of computation. Cognition may well be co-
extensive with information-processing – and have an abstract functional organisation independent
of an underlying physical system – but it is not self-evident that then all types of information-
processing are the result of computation. It is a just as intuitive notion that the brain could process
34 See Turing (1950) and Maudlin (1989) for examples of Turing machines consisting of mechanical parts and water
buckets respectively.
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information in a very non-computational fashion – i.e. dealing with informational content, but not
through representation and transformation of representation in  the Turing machine sense of the
words – and still rightly be thought of as an information-processing unit due to the exhibition of
complex behaviour. As long as van Heuveln cannot prove that cognition is the exact result of some
instance  of  computation,  his  defence  of  Computationalism  rests  instead  on  the  assertion that
cognition  is  the  exact  result  of  some  instance  of  computation.  In  other  words,  to  support  his
argument van Heuveln must assert without proof that only instances of computation can produce
cognition.
On the other hand it is fair to note that this may be as far as van Heuveln can go with his positive
argument, and that he achieves what he sets out to do. Granted, van Heuveln cannot prove that the
information-processing  of  the  brain  has  any  resemblance  what-so-ever  to  the  more  readily
recognisable information-processing of computers. He can, however, point to striking evidence for
appears  to  be an irrefutable  similarity between the two,  namely in  how information-processing
remains an abstract instantiation of a functional organisation independent of the underlying physical
system.  For  van  Heuveln,  who  rather  modestly  sets  out  to  create  a  conceptual  framework  on
cognition to work from and to defend the fleeting insight that “cognition has something to do with
the ability to process information” (van Heuveln 2000:1), this remains a notable achievement.
On the inconsistencies of Searle's Chinese Room argument
According to van Heuveln, Searle's argument is logically inconsistent. Let there for instance be an
ordinary human brain  with intentionality.  If  a  Demon of  sorts  invaded this  brain,  disabled  the
chemical neurotransmitters and took over the task of communicating between each transmitter and
receiver, this demon, by virtue of being but a part of a larger system, would not have intentionality
according  to  the  Chinese  Room argument35.  However,  since  all  the  causal  relationships  of  the
system  are  preserved,  the  brain  should,  to  the  contrary  of  Searle's  Chinese  Room  argument,
intuitively continue to “have all mental states (including intentionality) as before” (van Heuveln
2000:93).
Another  problem is  Searle's  notion  of  intentionality,  which  we  discussed  earlier.  To  Searle,
intentionality  is  an  obvious  fact  pertaining  to  human cognition  and  requires  certain  “low-level
physical  or  chemical  properties”  (van  Heuveln  2000:97).  Whether  other  physical  or  chemical
processes could produce the same type of intentionality in other types of systems remains to Searle
an “empirical question”36, wherefore he is not dismissing the notion outright (Searle 1980:81-82
quoted in van Heuveln 2000:94-95). However, Searle does not specify which level of properties are
crucial to intentionality, meaning that we can imagine a causal or functional organisation at  any
35 Unless of course one differentiates the syntactic computation of the man in the Chinese room from the demon's
causal  facilitation, arguing that  they do different kinds of work and therefore cannot be held comparable (van
Heuveln 2000:100). It  is not clear, however, how this difference – symbolic operations vs. causal, biochemical
operations of a presumably non-computational nature – is actually relevant when it comes to the production of
intentionality (van Heuveln 2000:100).
36 Martians,  for  instance,  could have intentionality even if  they were made of  other  physical  stuff  than humans.
Likewise, one could easily imagine a creation of a humanly made,  intelligent artefact with various kinds of non-
computational elements. Remember that this is not important to Searle's argument, however, as the challenge put
forth with the Chinese Room is whether computational processes alone are “sufficient to produce intelligence” (van
Heuveln 2000:110).
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level of the system which would be sufficient to produce intentionality37. However, we can just as
easily imagine the above-mentioned Demon invading and taking over the causal relationships of the
particular level of the system, on which intentionality is produced. In accordance with the argument
above,  the system as a  whole would retain intentionality,  which is  in  direct  contradiction with
Searle's argument, which states that since the man in the room has no intentionality, the entire room
can have no intentionality (van Heuveln 2000:98).   This inconsistency can be generalised to the
point  where  Searle's  argument  leads  to  the  conclusion,  that  no system can be  intentional  (van
Heuveln 2000:93).
Granted,  Searle  in  his  Chinese  Room argument  is  not  greatly  concerned  with  the  potential
intentionality of other physical systems. Rather, Searle wishes to refute that information-processing
processes alone are sufficient in producing intentionality. Van Heuveln, however, argues that the
Chinese  Room  is  an  implementation of  some  computational  system  and  therefore  must  have
“physical and chemical properties that go beyond its mere information-processing properties” (van
Heuveln 2000:97). Therefore Searle cannot be certain that there in the physical implementation of
the Chinese Room is no relevant intentionality (van Heuveln 2000:97), as it  is precisely in the
physical or chemical properties that intentionality is to be found. Thus van Heuveln concludes that
“... the conclusion of Searle's argument should have been that in the Chinese Room there may
or may not be intentionality, depending on the physical and chemical properties that are
present. However, Searle concluded that there is no intentionality, period. Hence, something
must have gone wrong in his argument” (van Heuveln 2000:98).
Searle argues that since neither the man nor the text book, pen or paper understands Chinese, it is
an  “absurd  view”  that  a  conjunction  of  these  things  would  then  understand  Chinese  (Searle
1980:78). Van Heuveln finds that Searle's argument is wrong because Searle commits the fallacy of
composition, i.e., falsely attributes properties (or lack thereof) to a whole based on the properties (or
lack thereof) of its parts (van Heuveln 2000:101)38. Another way of putting van Heuveln's objection
is that Searle's Chinese Room argument fails to account for the possibility of emergence. Thus van
Heuveln concludes, 
“... while Searle is right that none of the individual parts of the Chinese Room possess the
right  intentionality, by  interconnecting  these  parts  in  the  right  way, intentionality  may
emerge...  Searle  is  right  that  a  mere  conjunction will  not  do.  However, if  the parts  are
interconnected, then new properties can emerge. And the latter is the case in the Chinese
Room” (van Heuveln 2000:103).
The Systems Reply can be said to go to the heart of the inconsistency of the Chinese Room
argument, namely that the possibility of emergence has been overlooked (van Heuveln 2000:104). It
follows that the most successful reply to Searle's argument is the Systems Reply and, as we have
seen above, Searle's counter-argument against the Systems Reply isn't water proof. Like the claim
37 Intentionality could be produced by a sufficient functional organisation at  a neuron level,  a chemical level,  an
atomic level or a sub-atomic level etcetera, and still  be compatible with Searle's Chinese Room argument (van
Heuveln 2000:110).
38 An example  of  the fallacy of  composition would be to  deny aeroplanes the capability of  flight  because  their
individual parts cannot fly (or at least not very far). Note that the fallacy of composition does  not guarantee the
reverse to be the case, i.e. that any whole system would then automatically have some relevant intentionality from a
conjunction of parts without intentionality (van Heuveln 2000:101), or indeed that any selection of miscellaneous
parts brought together would have the power of flight.
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of Computationalism, the Systems Reply is a weaker claim than many of the other replies (van
Heuveln 2000:103-104). The Systems Reply is content with arguing that (1) some larger system
can be intentional, not that some larger system is intentional; and (2) that some larger system could
be intentional, but not exactly what larger system could be intentional (van Heuveln 2000:103-104).
Thus, van Heuveln argues, the Systems Reply supports Computationalism “by making the weakest
possible claim in support of it” (van Heuveln 2000:110-111).
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Hubert Dreyfus' and Maurice Merleau-Ponty's 
Phenomenology
This section will discuss and question the foundations of Computationalism and seek to develop an
idea  of  a  phenomenological  point  of  view of  the  state  and properties  of  consciousness  and its
connection to the body. 
The notion of A.I. involves as mentioned an adherence to medium independence and the idea
that  discrete  computations  give  rise  to  consciousness.  This  section  will  discuss  the  notion  of
embodiment  and  an  alternative  interpretation  of  the  ontology of  mind,  in  the  form of  Hubert
Dreyfus  and  Maurice  Merleau-Ponty.  In  other  words  a  discussion  of  arguments  from  the
phenomenological  tradition  will  allows  us  to  question  some  fundamental  ideas  underlying  the
notion of strong A.I.. At the same time we believe that this discussion will allows us to discuss John
Searle’s Chinese Room argument, with reference to prelinguistic intentionality.
Hubert Dreyfus writes in his relevantly titled “What Computers can’t do: A critique of Artificial
Reason” (1972)39, that man seen as a “General-purpose-symbol-manipulating-device” is based upon
a range of assumptions. Dreyfus notes that computer science and researchers within the fields of
A.I.  conducts  their  work from a  range of  naïve assumptions,  that  stand as  self-evident  for  the
research.  (Dreyfus  discusses  a  range of  assumptions  at  length,  but  two relevant  points  will  be
referred to back in the rest of this section. That is the biological and psychological assumptions).
The biological assumption refers to an idea that the human brain functions due to a range of
information processing/input-output models similar to a switchboard with on-off switches (Dreyfus,
1972: 68). In other words the functional topology of our brains function as a machine, and it is
running a programme similar to that of a computer.
The psychological assumptions on the other hand states that the brain works through a range of
informations-processing programmes that can generate intelligent behaviour. Dreyfus notes that the
psychological assumption (as well as the biological) is similar to a Humean notion of “matters of
facts” and “relations of ideas”. As well as the notion of Kantian metaphysics where being can be
understood from a set of rules that can be explained by reason. From a rationalistic standpoint the
idea that we can design an algorithm that can produce consciousness presupposes that we can speak
of a system, which can be simulated or “copied”.
However  the  psychological  and  biological  assumptions  point  to  an  idea  that  our  mind
understands and roams the world from a range of  input  that  is  being processed by a  range of
processes  similar  to  computer  programmes.  The  question  is  whether  the  mind  functions  as  a
computer, and whether our physical being is arranged so that computations could be running the
entire thing. 
Relevant to this project is the notion that it cannot be argued that the mind functions due to a
range  of  heuristic  programmes40,  and  that  explanations  for  a  connection  between  physical  and
39 Dreyfus, Hubert ”What Computers can't do – A Critique of Artificial Reason” (1972). Harper & Row, New York,
Evanston, San Francisco, London.
40 Dreyfus speaks of a certain type of computer programmes. These programmes will analyse from the possibilities at
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phenomenological processes from a computationalist position is insufficient (Dreyfus, 1972: 137). 
But can our immediate experience of the world not be explained through a sequence of input?
That  due  to  a  range of  processes  i.e.  we see neurones  fire  in  bursts  of  electricity,  and in  our
everyday lives we compare, classify and search lists of previous experiences in order to know how
to act and behave in different situations? Are human beings like computers?
No, a central point that is left out of with these questions is that humans have a body. We act
from and we relate to the world from a certain position and from a certain perspective. There exists
a split  between some immediate perception of an object,  or constellation in the world,  and the
fundamental judgement on behalf of the viewer. Noticing (Bemerken) an object does not in the
same instance entail the myriad of properties that are connected to them (Merleau-Ponty, 1945: 29).
A phenomenological level of investigation entails that we take a look at the immediate perception of
the world as it stands to our consciousness. 
The notion of medium independence entails that the body is dispensable, but if it is not it means
that intelligent behaviour is dependent upon it. As a consequence if it is not possible to programme
and design a computer without a body the project of creating strong A.I. is doomed to start with. 
Another  thinker  concerned  with  the  role  of  the  body  is  Maurice  Merleau-Ponty.  In
“Phenomenology of Perception” he argues for the importance of the phenomenological analysis of
the role of the body, and its connection to mind. As Merleau-Ponty writes: 
“(…) To see an object is to come to inhabit it and thereby grasp all things according to the
sides these other things turn towards the object (…) I consider my body, which is my point of
view upon the world, as one of the objects of that world (…) My present, which is my point of
view upon time, becomes one moment of time among all others, my duration becomes a
reflection or an abstract appearance of universal time, and my body becomes a mode of
objective space“ (Merleau-Ponty, 1945: 71-73).
The  meaning  that  is  connected  to  the  objects  as  they  appear  to  me  is  bound  to  a  level  of
consciousness that is  difficult  to explain from a physical science point of view. The immediate
analysis  of  experience  is  the  main  aim of  phenomenological  analysis,  and the  focus  lies  upon
finding the essence of things as they appear to us in our experience of the world. The consequence
of this  position is a shift  in the view of the role of the body and the general and fundamental
features of human activity. 
The process of interpretation comes to play a significant role. The fundamental role of perception
comes to take a part of a gradual or sudden realisation of my perception and the things around me.
In the sense that i would not make sense of the world from a phenomenological view as the process
of punctual or individual streams of data, but rather as the interpretation of the relations of the
whole.  The  body  structures  one’s  situation  and  experience  within  the  entirety  of  the  one’s
experience. 
hand what means should be taking into account in order to solve a problem. When looking at “real-life” problems a
certain range of possibilities are available and the solutions have to be found from those possibilities (Dreyfus,
1972: XXIV)
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Experience and Perception
Hubert Dreyfus notes that pattern-recognition, does not seem to happen in the same way in humans
as  in  machines.  Perception  and  the  immediate  experience  of  the  world  are  not  reducible  to  a
continuous  reading of  a  list  or  stream of  information.  That  is  what  a  computer  has  to  do.  An
example is listening to music or observing a dancer's movements, where the entirety is perceived
rather than its individual parts. A piece of music is not recognised based upon the qualities of the
independent notes, but by recognition of them as part of the melody (Dreyfus, 1972:150). Similarly
the movements of a dancer are not understood solely by jumps and gestures, but by their connection
to the context of the play. In other words when we look at the whole, we won’t see a range of
independently observable traits but by the perception of the whole of the onlooker. The sense of
what we experience is due to a range of impressions, that are dependent upon a central perspective. 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty notes that even the most factual perceptions of the world are due to
relationships between individual parts of the whole, rather than the things in themselves (Merleau-
Ponty, 1945: 4). This means that whenever i look at my computer, i do not recognise the computer
by itself as placed in empty space, but i see it as a part of a structure in relation to other things.
When  i  look  over  the  screen  i  relate  my  vision  to  the  horizon.  I  find  my  balance  as  the
interconnection of my body in itself and from my psychological notion of where i am in space. The
interrelationships of the different parts of the whole as it appears to me in the interconnection with
the vestibuloocular reflex etc.. My perception of the outside world consist in a phenomenological
field of impressions. A confusion of the senses would mean that there were no meaning, as the
interrelationship between the individual parts would become meaningless. 
The fundamental perceptual phenomenon is dependent upon a thing that is placed in relation to a
background,  wherefrom  meaning  comes  to  be.  In  other  words  in  order  to  explain  how  we
“interpret” the world and the patterns in it,  we firstly organise the structures to each other, and
secondly focus upon the individual part. An example of this process is the medium of film. If the
camera is zoomed completely in on an object it is difficult to recognise what it is, but as the camera
zooms out we recognise other details and are able to contextualise them to the rest. There are no
neutral features, and it all is related to the rest of the context. If you reach for a glass of water, and
catches a glass of milk instead it creates total disorientation. The meaning of the global is dependent
upon the recognition of patterns, but this pattern recognition is not dependent upon recognise parts
of the whole, but rather the recognition of the context (Dreyfus, 1972: 150).
Each point  can  only be perceived as  points  on  a  background.  The phenomenal  field  of  the
background points to a fundamental problematic trait of machines and computer. Since they, similar
to Turing machines, are capable of following procedures, that not necessarily take the outside world
into consideration. Accordingly, the whole is more than the sum of its parts, and the properties of
the whole cannot be explained from its parts. An example is the use of language. The meaning of
me writing “We’re having chicken tonight” could mean everything from “Okay we have to eat
chicken tonight” or “I have 5kg of cocaine for sale” in the right context. The semantics of language
are due to a broad set of relationships and are placed upon a social context, that in every case cannot
be written in the form of a computer programme. A phenomenological argument would find the
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process of creating a strong A.I. impossible, because of the ontology of human pattern recognition.
If we reach for a glass of water and meet the taste of milk, we are forced to reorder and decide a
total hypothesis that fits what we have met in the world.
When looking at  a fundamental characteristic of human perception it  becomes clear that the
notion of a psychological assumption may have some grounds. When one programmes a machine
the rules  must  be  clear  and discrete,  similar  to  a  monadic  system of  zeroes  and ones  that  are
absolute. When the premise is turned towards an understanding of lived experience as connected to
“fields”, “relations” or “configurations” it is a type that is not possible to design in the form an
algorithm or even simultaneous algorithms. We cannot speak of absolute values in the same way as
we would have in the a formal system. Denomination of a set value in order to design positive
read/write-techniques  is  to  miss  a  fundamental  point  when  speaking  of  consciousness.  As  this
property is associated with the notion of a gestalt. This point will be developed further in the next
section of embodiment. 
From  the  position  of  phenomenology  we  are  working  with  a  fundamental  split  between
foreground (the object in focus) and the background. We have a split between our bodies, which
consists  of  cells  and  a  myriad  of  interconnecting  systems,  as  well  as  our  sensory organs  and
neurological processes. On the other side lived experience points to a qualitative difference between
the physical processes and our psychological/phenomenological experience of the world we live in.
Merleau-Ponty  notes  that  objective  thought  breaks  down,  when  confronted  with  the
phenomenological field an ex. is the  body. Merleau-Ponty writes: 
“Let us,  then,  consider objective  thought  at  work in  the constitution of  our body as an
object, since this is a decisive moment in the genesis of the objective world. We will see
that, in science itself, one’s own body evades the treatment that they wish to impose upon it.
And since the genesis of the objective body is but a moment in the constitution of the object,
the body, by withdrawing from the objective world, will carry with it the intentional threads
that unite it to its surroundings and that, in the end, will reveal to us the perceiving subject
as well as the perceived world. (Merleau-Ponty, 1945: 74 ).
Your body is the one that you live in as your own, and not a physical object that stands apart
from you mind. 
Embodiment
But what role does the body play in intelligent behaviour? When both Dreyfus and Merleau-Ponty
speak of different levels of being, i.e. a physical and psychological/phenomenological level, they
refer to the positioning of the physical body, and a contingent and inseparable mind at the same
time.
The body plays a role as firstly a physical objects, that through its behaviour reaches a point
where it can supersede a purely physical status. In other words for Merleau-Ponty the view of the
body as an object among other objects (parts extra partes) misses the point, with the idea that the
body and the mind are incomparable sizes. The body is present in space and its connection with the
surrounding world. And Merleau-Ponty argues for the synthesis of the body as a physical presence
and the phenomenological level as the foundation for the mind-body connection. 
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He speaks of a body scheme as a way in which you can describe how the parts of one body
relates to one another. This means, with relevance to John Searle’s notion of intentionality, that the
body in itself stands for us as not consisting in individual parts, i.e. as a collection of points, but
they envelop each other in movement. The body plays a role, because movements and actions in the
world are directed towards tasks by the intentional person in question. As Merleau-Ponty writes:
“The experience of one’s own body teaches us to root it with existence” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945:
149). In order to relate to patterns with which the body is the central part, the body appropriates
itself with an outside world and finds itself as the envelope from which we can experience the world
around us (Merleau-Ponty, 1945: 149). 
At the same time we experience and have a sense of our bodies and their place in space. We have
a sense of connection with the world from a mix of properties connected to an introceptivity and
proprioceptivity. My body is connected with an idea of where i am and what i am doing. A global
awareness of an overall  position of myself  in  space (Merleau-Ponty,  1945:  101-102).  A central
gestalt  comes to  be as my body finds  itself  both positioned and directed towards  certain tasks
(Merleau-Ponty, 1945: 103). The awareness of my own body is not the consequence of some pin-
point idea of my elbow joint angle compared to my shoulder, but rather as the intuitive workings of
my arm to lifting a coffee cup or stirring a bowl.
A computationalist  point  of  view  would  entail  a  naïve  view  of  the  importance  of  internal
relations41. For the A.I. researcher in order to deal with information and to act intelligently in the
world the main aim is to programme and build a disembodied computer programme that produce
intelligent behaviour.
Similarly for Dreyfus  this  notion,  i.e.  the possibility of a disembodied intelligence,  becomes
unintelligible as the body contribute 3 functions. Dreyfus notes: 
“(1)  The inner horizon, that is,  the partially indeterminate, predelineated anticipation of
partially  indeterminate  data  (this  does  not  mean  the  anticipation  of  some  completely
determinate alternatives, or the anticipation of completely unspecified alternatives, which
would  be  the  only  possible  digital  implementation);  (2)  The  global  character  of  this
anticipation which determines the meaning of the details it assimilates and is determined by
them; (3) The transferability of this anticipation from one sense modality and one organ of
action to another. “ (Dreyfus, 1972: 167). 
When we attempt to provide an ontology of the human mind in the world, we reach a point
where we due to the limits of human awareness must be able to appropriate ourselves to the world
around  us.  An  example  is  if  an  old  man  uses  a  walking  stick  to  walk.  The  man  knows  the
smoothness and shape of the handle,  the weight  of the stick and its  position in space at  every
instance. In use and in the mediate experience of using the walking stick the man is not aware of its
position or the angle of the finer bones of his hands, but it becomes as one with the man in question
(Dreyfus, 1972: 164-165). This means that we through our bodies ex. are capable of using tools to
act  and  roam  our  environments  intuitively.  The  man’s  experience  is  mere  psychological  or
phenomenal one, as his intentionality points from himself to a point somewhere in the world around
him. The man appropriates his body to a certain task and experience his body as a part of the task,
rather than a segmented instance apart from the whole.
41 Remember that according to Heuveln the level of information-processing is sufficient for cognition.
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 This points is what Dreyfus speaks of as the inner and outer horizon (Dreyfus, 1972: 153). Our
outer horizon of the world, refers to the “background” information about the world that exists for
us, but can be ignored or excluded when we direct our gaze towards a certain object. It is the
backdrop of our perception. It is the world in-itself or the objective world outside ourselves that
stands before us filled with an entire range of objects. 
The inner horizon denotes that when we look at an object, we are aware that the object consist in
more than what we immediately see. When we look at a house ex. we will only see the front, but in
the back of our minds, we are aware, that it must have a back, sides, and at some level an interior
unbeknownst to us at present. The object in itself exist in a multiple of ways that is not directly
observable by us in our milieu/Umwelt (Merleau-Ponty/Husserl), but we have a world/Welt notion
that the thing in front of us consist in more than the immediate perception. The “something-more-
than-figure”consists  in  more  than  the  immediate  perception  of  it,  and  these  properties  will  be
experienced as co-present (Dreyfus, 1972: 153). We have a sense of the outside world and are able
to act upon this sense due to an inner meaningful horizon, that offers a more nuanced view of the
world, than an immediate input/output-model. 
Another example is language syntax, which in its sense allows a deeper understanding, but is
dependent upon a type of inner horizon. If we as language users were only capable of identifying
the meaning of individual morphemes or singular words a lot of meaning would be lost from natural
language. Similar to earlier examples a sentence can have a myriad of meanings, and the context
decides the meaning of the whole. 
This example reflects another point. Whenever we meet known objects or situations in the outer
horizon, it is filled with meaning (Dreyfus, 1972: 154). If the table is set for dinner, the meaning of
the whole is not determined by the position of the glasses in association with the cutlery around the
plate, but rather the connection of the parts to the whole. We have certain expectations to situations
and  we  intentionally  directs  ourselves  to  them  from  our  own  position.  In  other  words  the
perspective of lived experience, and thereby intentionality, takes a place is part in creating meaning
in the patterns we see around us.
An A.I. without an inner horizon, would have to work the opposite way. If a machine could only
function due to discrete operations from specified information a notion of semantics in language
and how we apply ourselves and relate ourselves to the outside world would be put on its head.
From a “database” of stored information the machine would first have to decide and process the
singular details one by one in order to over time create a picture of the “contours” of the facade of a
house, and in sequence recognise the sides, and back of the house followed by the interior. The
states of the machine allow no outer horizon.
This leads back to Searle’s point on prelinguistic intentionality. Human beings are, rather than
solid  state  machines,  temporal  subjects.  In  Searle's  analyses  of  prelinguistic  intentionality  it
becomes apparent that a fundamental trait of human consciousness is the role of intentionality and
its directness to an outside world. The properties of intentionality, i.e. perception, intention, belief
and  desire,  point  to  some  fundamental  connection  and  directness  towards  the  outside  world
wherefrom  meaning  arises.  Embodiment,  or  the  role  of  our  biological/neurological/chemical
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properties, becomes the prerequisite for meaning. Strong A.I. would not be possible since it has no
notion of a spatiality, and therefore no phenomenological positioning of itself to an outside world.
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Discussion
Can machines think? It appears that there are at least two opposing viewpoints. Let's return to the
claim of  Computationalism.  Computationalism holds  that  cognition is  computational  by nature.
Recall that this is a weak claim: Computationalism does not specify which computational processes
underlie cognition, merely that some computational processes must underlie cognition. However, if
Computationalism is  true,  there should be no obstacle  to  computers  being able  to simulate  the
circumstances under which cognition could emerge. Searle, on the other hand, categorically denies
that  computations  alone  (i.e.  without  intentionality  derived  from  a  biological,  neurological
structure) could cause or produce cognition. Joining Searle are Merleau-Ponty and Dreyfus, who
hold embodiment to be a prerequisite for human cognition.
Searle's notion of intentionality is definitely at the core of the issue, as intentionality undoubtedly
plays  an  important  role  in  the  mental,  while  also  being  the  product  of  some  fundamental
neurological  structure.  The  concept  spans  the  mental  as  well  as  the  physical,  thus  making
intentionality the meeting point between the very abstract cognition of Computationalism and the
transcendental phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty.
Can these two seemingly opposing viewpoints – the abstract computationalist view on cognition
and the embodied, phenomenological view on consciousness – be brought together? The remainder
of this section will attempt to do just that.
Weak Computationalism and weak embodiment
As already stated in the section dealing with van Heuveln's argument for Computationalism, van
Heuveln argues only for the weak claim that cognition can be understood in computational terms.
The argument puts forth convincing evidence for at least a striking resemblance between brain and
computer in terms of abstraction from the underlying physical properties42.  It  remains uncertain
whether the information-processing of the brain imitates that of a computer, which is why a stronger
claim than van Heuveln's   –  that  computations  are  sufficient in  creating  cognition – would be
unsupported. In the meantime a computational foundation for the study of cognition has been laid
down.  Time  will  tell  if  the  weak  claim of  Computationalism can  become the  strong  claim of
Computationalism.
Central to the notion of embodiment remains the tenacious connection between mind and body.
Dreyfus correctly locates the underlying Cartesian assumption of A.I. research, namely that there is
a  separate  mental  system  which  can  be  mimicked,  simulated  or  copied  independently  of  its
underlying physical, chemical or biological system43.
The  embodiment  argument  states  that  a  direct  connection  to  the  world  (in  some sense)   is
42 Van Heuveln's supporting argument – that cognition persists across changes in the details of the underlying physical
system if the cognition's functional organisation remains the same – comes across as perhaps even more convincing
in comparison. It captures the problematic but surprisingly robust intuition that the mental is largely independent
from the underlying physical processes governing the brain.
43 This assumption is echoed by van Heuveln, whose computationalist claim is founded on the very notion of an
abstract cognitive system emerging from an underlying physical one.
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essential for the emergence of consciousness. The claim of Dreyfus & Merleau-Ponty is a strong
claim.  Not  only  (1)  must  any type  of  human-like  reason  by definition  have  the  same  human
properties (intentionality and embodiment) to have cognition, the claim also states that (2) all types
of reason must have these human properties44. We would argue that the first claim is trivially true by
virtue of the definition of human-like reason. A human-like reason would probably not be human-
like if it lacked the human properties of intentionality and embodiment. The second claim however
– which is the strong claim put forth by Dreyfus, Merleau-Ponty and to a lesser extent Searle45 – is
much more interesting.
The sights of Dreyfus & Merleau-Ponty are fixed squarely on the human concept of reason, with
all  its  phenomenology and intentionality.  Thus the  notion  of  a  disembodied  A.I.  without  these
properties must seem all but impossible. Granted, all empirical evidence so far points to the second,
strong claim being true – we have yet to stumble upon a disembodied intelligence! There is a risk of
jumping to conclusions, however. For instance, can we really know for certain that embodiment or
intentionality is necessary for any type of reason, and not just human-like reason? Is what appears
to be of theoretical importance to the definition of intelligence actually of theoretical importance to
intelligence46? Perhaps we still require a philosophically satisfactory answer to the question whether
disembodied A.I. – which would perhaps be a “new conception of reason” as Dreyfus puts it – must
be bound by the same preconditions as the “old”, human and embodied conception of reason47.
This is not to say that the embodiment argument is a superficial one. Take for instance Dreyfus'
claim that states that human perception is simultaneous, contextual and holistic pattern-recognition.
This claim is intuitively at odds with the claim that computations underlie cognition. If computation
is serial by definition and therefore must deal with one data point at a time, it would appear that
human perception has a distinct advantage48.
But what separates a human pattern-recognition of “the entirety” from that of a computer's serial
perception of the individual parts? Perhaps this is a question of speed and processing power. Let
there  be  a  perceiving,  computational  system which,  in  the  time  it  takes  for  a  human  mind  to
properly recognise the entirety of a given event (say the first few measures of Requiem by Mozart),
can perceive and process each part individually and piece together an impression of the entirety.
44 The second point has throughout this project been put negatively, most notably by Searle: no artificial intelligence
can exist  without  human properties.  Also note that  the first  claim is  a  much weaker and perhaps much more
defensible claim than the second claim. Van Heuveln calls Searle's strong claim against intentionality in machines a
misguided notion of “carbon chauvinism” (van Heuveln 2000:112). We argue that the strong embodiment claim
falls into the same trap.
45 Recall  that  Searle,  when asked about  whether martians could have human-like intentionality,  finds it  to be an
empirical  (rather  than  a  logical)  question.  We simply do  not  know whether  other  non-carbon-based  physical
systems could give rise to the same type of intentionality as carbon-based physical systems, which is why this
question is beyond the scope of philosophy.
46  Recall that Turing warns against holding electricity to be essential to the theoretical definition of intelligence, even
though electricity plays a part in both brains and electrical computers (see the above section on the Turing Test).
47 Van Heuveln makes the convincing case that  cognition is emergent,  meaning that  the body to some degree is
irrelevant to cognition. Thereby van Heuveln supports Turing's intuitive notion, that the intelligence of a machine
hinges  on  its  cognitive  capabilities  alone  and  not  its  physical  prowess.  It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  an
underlying physical system is still required for the emergence of cognition to happen, thus the claim narrowly steers
clear of a cartesian dualism.
48 Of  course,  the  argument  of  Merleau-Ponty  and  Dreyfus  has  more  parts  than  Dreyfus'  claim  about  pattern-
recognition, but the notion of human perception does play a vital, recurring role throughout their argument.
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What separates this computational system from the human mind other than the purported difference
between the means to the same end49? Perhaps Dreyfus' unique pattern-recognition is but a highly
complex  computation  which  takes  in  the  minute  details  at  such  unfathomable  speeds  that  the
perception of the whole appears simultaneous. It follows that a machine's pattern-recognition being
on  par  with  human  pattern-recognition  is  not  metaphysically  impossible,  but  rather,  at  most,
practically  impossible.  What  may  seem  impossible  today  could  be  technologically  feasible
tomorrow.
Can weak Computationalism be compatible with a weak version of the embodiment argument?
For the sake of the argument let's assume that the weak claim of Computationalism turns out to be
true,  and  that  some  sort  of  computational  processes  underlie  cognition  and  that  cognition  has
something to do with information-processing.  Let us assume that these computations are necessary
in creating cognition but not sufficient50. Let us now imagine further that a weak version of the
embodiment argument is true and that a number of pre-computational or pre-linguistic components
are  necessary –  but  not  sufficient  –  for  cognition.  Thus,  we can  imagine  a  cognitive  (but  not
necessarily human!) being, with a cognition which in some sense is reducible to computations, but
with the input/outputs through a direct connection to the world being essential for the cognition to
work. Furthermore we could imagine that the information-processing on the computational level
would be fed an influx of information provided by the bodily senses. This information would be
pre-formed or pre-shaped by some filter of intentions and anticipations in relation to the world, i.e.
intentionality.  This  intentionality,  in  the  words  of  Searle,  would be  the  result  of  certain causal
powers on a physical level in the system. Thus informed by the senses, the computations would
process the information and thereby produce complex behaviour capable of passing the Turing test.
In such a configuration both embodiment and computations would be necessary but not individually
sufficient to cognition51.
It would appear that there isn't a major incompatibility between van Heuveln's weak claim of
Computationalism  and  a  weak  variant  of  Merleau-Ponty's  embodiment  argument.  Indeed,  it
certainly looks as if the hybrid system described above would be a possible one. While the thought
experiment has its fair share of problems52, if taken seriously, one interesting question arises: if
49 Indeed, if the thought experiment was found to be true, why should the means be different when – as van Heuveln
notes in regards to information-processing – there appears to be striking similarities between the level of abstraction
taking place in computers and brains respectively?
50 This assumptions could be supported by the notion that information-processing by definition requires information.
If this information is not intrinsic to the computational system it would have to come from somewhere else. This
would mean that while computational processes were necessary for cognition, they wouldn't be sufficient without
external information coming in. Granted, information could very well be intrinsic to the system if the all necessary
information was available in the form of a rule book or a database from the very get-go. The Chinese Room
argument certainly popularised this idea.
51 Note that this thought experiment only works if both the embodiment and the computationalist claim are understood
in their weak sense. Their strong variants are, as it has been shown throughout this project, immediately at odds
with each other.
52 The thought experiment, by virtue of being a combination of two positions, are susceptible to the same critique as
the critique levelled at both of these positions: The origin of intentionality remains unexplained even though it is the
most important factor in explaining cognition. The exact process by which cognition emerges from some kind of
computations also remains mysterious and unexplained.  Finally,  the thought  experiment,  which is an arguably
brutal attempt at squeezing the two opposing viewpoints together, might be misrepresenting the core arguments of
Computationalism and the embodiment-argument respectively. Dreyfus and Merleau-Ponty would perhaps frown at
the the idea of  cognition being in  any way reducible to  computations,  while the argument of  van Heuveln is
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neither  part  is  individually  sufficient  in  creating  cognition,  what  would  happen  to  an  already
cognitive system if one of these parts – for instance intentionality or the entire physical body of the
system  –  was  suddenly  removed?  As  we  shall  see  shortly  when  discussing  another  thought
experiment, this time by by Daniel C. Dennett, it is an intuitive notion that a cognitive system could
retain its functional organisation even if the body of the system was removed or changed over time.
Embodiment and intentionality
As already stated, Searle’s discussion for the importance of intentionality points to a similar line of
argument, as the one conducted by Merleau-Ponty. Accordingly this section will further nuance the
notion of embodiment, and show its relevance to intentionality. Finally the discussion will seek to
clarify its relevance to the discussion of strong A.I..
When Merleau-Ponty speaks of the habitual body, it becomes important to speak of the role of
the body and its connection to how we find meaning. The nature of perception and the ability to
make sense of the world is due to our body. Our sense of the outside world is a consequence of
some  embodied  connection  with  it.  As  Searle  would  argue,  intentionality  comes  down  to  the
perspective of some biological being in the world.
From  a  phenomenological  level  the  features  of  consciousness,  that  enable  us  to  have  a
meaningful sense of our surroundings, are not due to some outside “self-contained” information we
receive  in  discrete  bundles.  Rather  some fundamental  features  of  human activity  appear  to  be
anticipatory.  In other words how we make sense of objects’ interrelations are rather due to our
expectations. For example when we see a dinner table, the plates are placed in a certain manner and
the situation may satisfy or frustrate our anticipation of a birthday dinner. It is the aim of Merleau-
Ponty to show, that the notion of body schema reveals our body’s ability to take form due to our
habits.
The body comes  to  have  an  understanding of  parts  of  the  world,  and has  a  type  of  bodily
consciousness due to the world’s imprint on it. Our intentional habits direct us through the world in
a  certain  manner.  Accordingly  there  is  no  clear  mind/body-split.  The  physiological  and
psychological becomes two sides of the same coin. When one speaks of the one, it becomes an
abstraction from the other. 
Merleau-Ponty’s  point  with  this  in  mind,  is  that  human  consciousness  is  a  synthesis  of  the
psychological and physiological. The acquisition of bodily habits is the acquisition of the world, as
Merleau-Ponty writes:
“Every habit is simultaneously motor and perceptual because it  resides, as we have said,
between  explicit  perception  and  actual  movement,  in  that  fundamental  function  that
simultaneously delimits our field of vision and our field of action” (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 153).
As with the example of the old man’s use of a walking stick one could argue that the man
continuously assesses the position of the stick, “But the habit does not consist in interpreting the
pressure of the cane on the hand like signs of certain positions of the cane, and then these positions
as signs of an external object – for the habit relieves us of this very task” (Merleau-Ponty, 2012:
arguably losing most of its punch in the process.
20/05/15 41/48
153-154). The use of objects is an example of how we can roam the world in ways that is not just
bodily, but also mental.
The dialogue of body and the surrounding world is internalised, and the body is appropriated to
the state of the world around it. As the runner trains for a marathon, his body will acquire a certain
relation to the world around it. The process will influence the composition and reactions of his body
to the stress of long runs, and his mind will find a way to appropriate itself to the unending step-by-
step motions. The body-type that is required for certain motions is a part of consciousness, that
would seem almost inseparable from it. 
This point leads back to the discussion of Searle’s Chinese Room argument. The inability of a
machine to  exhibit  intentionality will  mean a fundamental  inability to  relate  to  the  world in  a
meaningful  way.  The characteristics  of  intentionality in  animals  points  to  perception,  intention,
belief,  desire  and  some  kinds  of  memories  (Searle,  2009:  179).  In  other  words  intentionality
requires a body. As Searle argues for some preliminary biological traits to the logical structure of
language,  it  becomes clear  that  what  intentionality entails  is  the directness  of  one’s  perception
towards an outside world. The aim or plans of the animal or human in question, are framed by their
anticipations or beliefs and their desires. Their habits are intentional, and the propositional content
of their habits will have an effect on how they exists between the possible abstraction of their mind
and body.
Accordingly van Heulven’s idea of a computational mind may point to an assumption about the
functional  structure of  the brain.  This assumption is  that  the brain functions  as an information
processor. But when Searle argues for the brain as having some intrinsic features notably beliefs,
desires and intentions, then what could this mean for the brain’s functional structure? It calls for the
question  of  whether  or  not  the  steps,  by which  our  neurology makes  sense  of  the  world,  are
computational  in  nature.  Rather  than  speaking  of  an  information  processor,  Searle’s  notion  of
intentionality may point to a view of the brain that, intrinsic to itself, seeks to make sense of the
world and for example the relations of objects within it. In other words a brain with an functional
topology that allows for intentionality, may not be due to some information process, but aims to
make sense of the world by the agents beliefs, desires and intentions53.
From a computationalist framework a critique of the functionality of such a brain could quickly
becomes mechanistic in nature. If one sees cognition as the explanation of human consciousness,
the  view of  the  functionality  of  the  brain  may fall  to  that  of  a  formal  system.  The  nature  of
computations means the anticipation of cognition as the result of some processual trait of the mind.
Naturally, an explanation of such a process will require a mechanistic or functional interpretation
i.e. in the form of some type of formal system. 
Accordingly,  despite  the  objection  of  the  systems  reply54,  Searle’s  point  still  stands.  Some
systems may give rise to consciousness, but the attempt to abstract human consciousness from its
body may be difficult or directly impossible. If we were to create a strong A.I. it would, due to the
nature of computation, mean a lack of embodiment and intentionality.
53 Remember Dreyfus, and the discussion of the biological and psychological assumptions.
54 Remember that the Systems Reply holds that a conjunction of parts can give rise to understanding, even if such a
system fails to account for intentionality (and embodiment).
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Disembodiment
Yet  it  is  still  possible  to  question  this  statement.  Where  is  my  consciousness  housed?  When
Merleau-Ponty argues for the synthesis of the psychological and physiological, there is still a tacit
split or intuitive notion of a “me” housed inside a “body”. Daniel Dennett pumps this intuition in his
sci-fi-esque short story “Where am I?”5556. 
Let’s assume that Dennett’s brain is put in a laboratory vat, with radio transmitters taking over
the connection between the brain and his now “brainless” body. As a consequence of the procedure,
Dennett points out the difficulty in indexicality: If he intuitively experiences that he is still ‘here
between the eyes’ of his body, this intuition is at odds with the reality of the brain being in the next
room. Is it possible forego the body and “think oneself back” into the brain in the vat? Dennett
provides reasonable evidence that this form of mental gymnastics are not completely foreign to
humans: Workers in laboratories, for instance, are able to shift their “point-of-view” from their own
hands to the mechanical arms they use for handling dangerous materials. Similarly to the example
of the old man with the walking stick, these people are able to shift their point of view from the use
of their own hands to the manipulative abilities of the finely tuned mechanical arms (Dennett, 2006:
3). The repositioning of one’s own mind seems difficult when one is housed and perceives the world
from a body. But when Dennett’s mission to disarm the nuclear warhead goes wrong, and his brain
loses  the  connection  to  the  body  in  the  field,  his  concepts  of  ‘here’ and  ‘self’ are  suddenly
transported back into the vat.
This  makes  intuitive  sense,  but  as  always,  the  intuitions  have  some  serious  repercussions.
Dennett himself argues that his concept of self remains unchanged by the tiny mishap57. However,
let’s say that Searle’s concept of intentionality was present in Dennett’s unique combination of brain
and body. What happens with this intentionality when the brain is disconnected from the body?
Does the intentionality linger in some memory form, wherefore the system as a whole cannot be
said to ‘lose’ intentionality by losing the body? Or does the body provide a continued sustenance to
the intentionality of the system? This issue could point towards the claim, that while intentionality
and embodiment  is  necessary in  the creation  of  cognition  and consciousness,  they may not  be
necessary in sustaining cognition and consciousness.
What  would  Dreyfus  and  Merleau-Ponty  say  to  Dennett’s  thought  experiment?  Could  their
55 Dennett, Daniel C. “Where Am I?” in: Hofstadter, Douglas R., and Daniel C. Dennett. "The Mind's I: Fantasies and
Reflections on Self & Soul." (2006).
56 The premise for the story is that he due to a long process has been chosen to partake on a secret mission for the
pentagon of the United States of America. Due to a failed test of a nuclear atomic warhead, Dennett was chosen to
commit to a surgical procedure, where his brain was fitted a range of transmitters that allowed him to control his
body. The intricate composition of the warhead has caused a type of radiation, which only would harm certain
tissues in the brain. Accordingly Dennett would be able to collect the warhead, with his brain safely contained in
life-support vat (Dennett, 2006:1). Dennett agrees to undergo the procedure. When he wakes up the question to this
whole procedure stands “where am i?”. Intuitively one could ask answer, “of course i am in my brain, it is the seat
of the transformation of my senses meeting with the world”. But while his brain may be seated “back home in the
office” his experience and sensations would still be housed between his eyes. When Dennett makes the role of the
body explicit it becomes difficult to envision the departure of “me” from my body (Dennett, 2006: 2-3).
57 When Dennett notes the serious split, he is hit strongly by the absence of his body. Dennett notes the mind/body-
connection by the strange emotions of dread and fear lacking some bodily aspects. An immaterial soul may be
intuitively possible, but the fundamental attributes of our experience has a fundamental bodily aspect (Dennett,
2006: 5).
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conception of human reason be applicable to this unique case, where a once-bodied intelligence
suddenly became disembodied? Granted, a prolonged discussion of this topic is beyond the scope of
this project. However, Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the phantom limb seem to be of importance here.
What distinguishes Dennett’s unique case from that of an amputee? Merleau-Ponty would probably
not say that an amputee was less conscious or less capable of cognition because of a lack of a
specific bodily limb. It would then appear as if Dennett’s disembodied brain in a vat would still
experience a form of ‘phantom body’. This could tie in with Searle’s notion of intentionality as
stated  earlier.  Perhaps  intentionality  subsists  because  of  the  mind’s  inevitable  experience  of  a
phantom body? Or maybe the consequence of the intentional  mind is  that a  thought cannot be
purpose-free and intent-less, since the perspective of a disembodied mind may still have a certain
propositional content of mind with a direction of fit.
The  consequence  of  this  discussion is  that  maybe a  strong A.I.  may be possible  due to  the
possibility of an enduring mind i.e. a disembodied mind that exists after the separation from its
body. This may be an intuitive point, that has a broad consequences for how we look at the mind. 
The tacit acceptance of a mind/body problem shows that “both sides” have some merit.  The
computationalist  argument  for  mind  misses  the  importance  of  the  role  of  embodiment  and
intentionality.  While  a phenomenological analysis  of the attributes of the human mind,  may be
hindered  by just  that,  i.e.  that  a  different  type  of  consciousness  could  be  feasible  by the  next
generation of hardware and software. Yet it is possible to ponder how one would create an interface,
that can combine the abstract positive architecture of a computer programme and the physical body. 
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Conclusion
This project discussed in detail whether the notion of thinking machines is a plausible one.
Alan Turing held thinking machines to be inevitable by the end of the century. However, Turing
did not attempt to prove why this should be the case. John Searle, on the other hand, categorically
denies in his Chinese Room argument that syntactic computations can give rise to understanding or
any type  of  cognitive  state,  thus  dooming  the  prospect  of  so-called  Strong  AI.  Cognition  and
understanding,  Searle  argues,  require  a  sort  of  pre-linguistic  intentionality,  which  appear  to  be
unique to humans (and other animals).
Bram van Heuveln dismisses Searle’s argument by referring to the notion of emergence. While a
part of a given computational system might not have understanding, van Heuveln argues, there is
nothing stopping an interconnected conjunction of parts in generating understanding and cognition
through some process of emergence. According to van Heuveln, the Systems Reply is the only valid
counter-argument to the Chinese Room argument. Van Heuveln’s positive argument for the thesis of
Computationalism – that cognition reduces to computations – is not without its flaws however, as
the final argument for the similarity between cognition and computation is found to be lacking.
Thus Computationalism must be content in being a weak, rather than a strong claim.
Hubert Dreyfus and Maurice Merleau-Ponty argue for the importance of the body in cognition
and consciousness. They support Searle in noting that some abstract, computationalist intelligence
is an impossibility without some sort of direct connection to the world.
In the discussion we argued that there is insubstantial proof for a strong computationalist claim
and for the strong embodiment claim. A strong computationalist claim is unfeasible because there is
no definitive proof as to whether the information-processing of the brain really imitates that of a
digital  computer.  Likewise,  the  strong  embodiment  claim  holds  human-like  embodiment  and
intentionality to be essential to any possible cognition. But we require a philosophically satisfactory
answer  to  the  question  whether  human-like  intentionality  and  embodiment  is  essential  to  non-
human-like cognition, that is, A.I.. Even with substantial evidence backing up the weak embodiment
claim – that human-like embodiment and intentionality is essential to human cognition – it is not an
argument for human-like embodiment and intentionality being essential to all kinds of cognition.
Habits have an important influence on the body, and therefore also an immense influence on human
consciousness  and cognition.  A strong computationalist  abstraction  of  the  mind from the  body
would, according to Merleau-Ponty and Searle, be difficult or even impossible. In the process we
found  that  the  weak  computationalist  claim  and  a  weak  embodiment  claim,  with  some
modifications,  could  be  compatible.  This  raised  a  number  of  issues  which  we  discussed  with
inspiration from a thought experiment by Daniel C. Dennett.
We find that  both  sides  have flawed reasoning and that  there are  no definitive knock-down
arguments – with strong claims – from either side. The brain could be a computational system, but
there is no definitive proof that this is the case. Searle’s notion of intentionality could be essential in
human cognition, but van Heuveln provides convincing arguments as to why this isn’t necessarily
the case.  Embodiment appears to be essential  to human cognition,  judging by all  the empirical
20/05/15 45/48
evidence, but there is no convincing argument that embodiment is essential to non-human types of
cognition. While the jury is still out on whether thinking machines are possible or not, we find that
there  is  reason  to  suggest  that  the  weak  claim  of  Computationalism  and  a  weak  appeal  to
embodiment can be compatible.
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